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Making Matters Worse: The Safe Streets
and Communities Act and the Ongoing
Crisis of Indigenous Over-Incarceration
RYAN NEWELL *
The Safe Streets and Communities Act (SSCA), a recent and wide-reaching piece of the
Conservative Party of Canada’s tough-on-crime agenda, will exacerbate the ongoing crisis
of Indigenous over-incarceration. In this article, I review the extensive literature that addresses
the causes of Indigenous over-representation in the Canadian criminal justice system before
assessing the impact of R v Gladue, nearly fifteen years after the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision. I analyze how the SSCA will restrict courts’ resort to Gladue, thus resulting in the
incarceration of increasing numbers of Indigenous people. I then develop one avenue of
constitutional challenge to the SSCA’s mandatory minimum sentences that is tailored to
Indigenous offenders. Drawing on insights from Gladue and from the cases that followed it, I
argue that the meaning of “cruel and unusual punishment” under section 12 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms should shift in the case of Indigenous offenders to account
for the well-established connections between colonialism and the over-incarceration of
Indigenous people.
La Loi sur la sécurité des rues et des communautés (LSRC), élément récent et de grande portée
du programme de lutte contre la criminalité du Parti conservateur du Canada, exacerbera
la crise permanente du taux d’incarcération démesurément élevé des Autochtones. Dans cet
article, j’examine la documentation abondante qui aborde les causes de la surreprésentation
des Autochtones dans le système canadien de justice pénale avant d’évaluer, quinze ans
après les faits, l’impact du jugement R. c. Gladue de la Cour suprême du Canada. J’analyse la
façon dont la LSRC restreindra la possibilité pour les tribunaux d’invoquer le jugement Gladue,
ce qui entraînera l’incarcération d’un plus grand nombre d’Autochtones. Je développe ensuite
une approche spécifique aux contrevenants autochtones pour contester la constitutionnalité

*

J.D., Osgoode Hall Law School, 2012. Associate at Sack Goldblatt Mitchell LLP. I would
like to thank Kent McNeil as well as the editors and anonymous reviewers for their helpful
feedback on a previous draft of this article.
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des peines minimales obligatoires en vertu de la LSRC. Tirant parti de ce que nous apprend le
jugement Gladue et des jugements ultérieurs, je fais valoir que la signification de « châtiment
cruel et inhabituel » en vertu de l’article 12 de la Charte Canadienne des Droits et Libertés
devrait être modifiée dans le cas des contrevenants autochtones afin de tenir compte de
la corrélation bien établie qui existe entre le colonialisme et l’incarcération démesurément
élevée des Autochtones.
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THE SAFE STREETS AND COMMUNITIES ACT1 (SSCA) received Royal Assent on 13

March 2012 and its various components came into force in a staggered sequence
between August and November 2012.2 The impact of the SSCA’s wide-ranging
reforms to the Canadian criminal justice system will surely be felt for years to
come. As the centrepiece of the Conservative Party of Canada’s tough-on-crime
agenda, the SSCA represents a significant step in a massive policy shift towards
an expansion of the Canadian prison system. The legislation comes at a time
when the Government of Canada’s own statistics demonstrate that 93 per cent of
1.
2.

SC 2012, c 1.
See Canada, Department of Justice, News Release, “Backgrounder: The Safe Streets and
Communities Act Four Components Coming Into Force” (June 2012) online: <http://www.
justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/nr-cp/2012/doc_32759.html>.
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Canadians report that they are “satisfied with their personal safety from crime.”3
Not only will the law cost millions of dollars to implement and send thousands
more people to prison, its passage has given rise to serious tensions within the
structure of Canadian federalism.4
The consequences of the SSCA are likely to be especially disastrous for
Indigenous people.5 A crisis of over-incarceration among Indigenous people in
Canada has been well documented for decades. Yet, the number of Indigenous
people being sent to Canadian prisons continues to grow. The SSCA will only
make matters worse.
Relying on the multitude of existing research, Part I of this article explores the
dimensions and underlying causes of the crisis of Indigenous over-representation6
in the Canadian criminal justice system. I argue that the causes of the crisis are
hardly a mystery; they have been well understood for decades. Part II explains
the legislative and judicial interventions that have been undertaken to address
the crisis and then turns to evaluate their efficacy in light of the insights gleaned
from the wealth of research highlighted in Part I. Part III introduces the SSCA,
charting the way that the draft legislation, Bill C-10, was debated in Parliament,
in order to demonstrate that the law’s harmful effects were made amply clear
before its enactment. Special attention is paid to the voices of Indigenous people
3.

4.

5.

6.

Shannon Brennan, “Canadians’ Perceptions of Personal Safety and Crime, 2009” in Statistics
Canada, Juristat (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, December 2011) at 5, online: <http://www.
statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2011001/article/11577-eng.pdf>.
See e.g. Tobi Cohen, “Tories Use Majority to Pass Omnibus Crime Bill,” National
Post (12 March 2012), online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/03/12/
contentious-tory-crime-bill-passes-as-countrys-biggest-provinces-voice-concerns-over-costs/>.
The terms “Indigenous,” “Aboriginal,” “Native,” and “First Nations” have loaded political
implications, an in-depth exploration of which is beyond the scope of this article. The
term “Aboriginal” is understood by some people as connoting an inherently assimilationist
orientation towards the Canadian state. See e.g. Taiaiake Alfred, Wasáse: Indigenous Pathways
of Action and Freedom (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2005) at 126. Although this view
is certainly not universally held among Indigenous people, I nonetheless choose to use the
term “Indigenous” to acknowledge that “Aboriginal” is a contested term. That said, the term
“Aboriginal” is used in many of the sources that I draw upon and analyze, including judicial
authorities, research by governmental commissions, and academic articles by Indigenous and
non-Indigenous scholars.
I employ the terms “over-representation” and “over-incarceration” throughout this article
somewhat reluctantly. Given many Indigenous nations’ claims to sovereignty and their
contestation of the unilateral imposition of Canadian criminal law onto their societies, it seems
inappropriate to articulate the problem as one of over-representation. Would any amount of
Indigenous representation in the Canadian criminal justice system—even if it were consistent
with the proportion of Indigenous people in the Canadian population—be appropriate?
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and their allies who raised concerns during the debates about how Bill C-10
would compound the ongoing crisis of over-incarceration. I then provide a basic
outline of the elements of the SSCA that are likely to lead to the imprisonment of
even greater numbers of Indigenous people. In Part IV, I develop one avenue of
constitutional challenge to the SSCA’s mandatory minimum sentences that may be
pursued by Indigenous offenders. I explore how the analysis performed by courts
under section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms7 can be developed
to account for the unique circumstances of Indigenous people and mobilized to
strike down the SSCA’s mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. I investigate
the possibility of section 12 challenges as a strategy of harm reduction in the
face of a law that, if unchallenged, will surely have grave impacts on Indigenous
communities across the country. By identifying opportunities to imbue the
section 12 analytical framework with the insights of R v Gladue8 and subsequent
jurisprudence, I argue that the meaning of cruel and unusual punishment must
shift in the case of Indigenous offenders to address the undeniable connections
between colonialism and the drastic over-representation of Indigenous people in
Canadian jails and prisons.

I. INDIGENOUS OVER-INCARCERATION AND ITS CAUSES
A. THE NUMBERS

Indigenous people are drastically over-represented in the Canadian criminal justice
system. One way to begin an analysis of what the Supreme Court of Canada
(Court) referred to as a “crisis in the Canadian criminal justice system”9 is with
reference to statistics. While Indigenous people represented approximately 3 per
cent of the total Canadian adult population according to the 2006 Census, in
2008/2009 they constituted 27 per cent of those admitted into provincial and
territorial prisons, 18 per cent of those admitted into federal prisons, 21 per cent
of those on remand, and 20 per cent of those on conditional sentences.10 Between
1998/1999 and 2007/2008, there was a decrease in the total number of people
admitted into provincial and territorial custody. Within that total, however, the
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c
11 [Charter].
8. [1999] 1 SCR 688, 171 DLR (4th) 385 [Gladue cited to SCR].
9. Ibid at para 64.
10. Donna Calverley, “Adult Correctional Services in Canada, 2008/2009” in Statistics Canada,
Juristat (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 2010) at 5, online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85002-x/2010003/article/11353-eng.pdf>.
7.
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proportion of Indigenous people sentenced to custody actually increased from 13
per cent to 18 per cent.11
Incarceration rates for Indigenous women and youth are even further skewed.
Among all women sentenced to provincial and territorial custody between
1998/1999 and 2007/2008, the proportion of Indigenous women increased from
17 per cent to 24 per cent.12 In 2008/2009, Indigenous women represented 37
per cent of all women admitted into custody.13 In the same period, Indigenous
youth represented 36 per cent of youth admitted into custody.14 The proportion of
Indigenous youth sentenced to custody is 5.5 times greater than their proportion
of the total youth population.15
The disproportionate rate of Indigenous incarceration is more severe in
some provinces than in others. For example, in Saskatchewan, Indigenous people
constituted 11 per cent of the total adult population in 2006 but made up 80 per
cent of those sentenced to custody in 2008/2009.16 In Manitoba, Indigenous people
represented 12 per cent of the total adult population but represented 71 per cent of
those sentenced to prison over the same period.17
B. STUDIED, RESTUDIED, OVER-STUDIED18

Prompted by a crisis of less extreme, but nonetheless alarming, proportions in the
early 1990s, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal People (RCAP) undertook a
wide-ranging study of the relationship between Indigenous people and the Canadian
criminal justice system. Reflecting on insights gleaned from existing research and
its own series of public hearings at which Indigenous people across the country
offered their input, RCAP concluded that there was “remarkable consensus on
some fundamental issues and, in particular, on how the justice system has failed

11. Samuel Perreault, “The Incarceration of Aboriginal People in Adult Correctional Services”
in Statistics Canada, Juristat (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, July 2009) at 5, online: <http://
www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2009003/article/10903-eng.pdf>.
12. Ibid.
13. Calverley, supra note 10 at 11.
14. Donna Calverley, Adam Cotter & Ed Halla, “Youth Custody and Community Services in
Canada, 2008/2009” in Statistics Canada, Juristat (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, Spring
2010) at 5, online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2010001/article/11147-eng.
pdf>.
15. Ibid at 12.
16. Calverley, supra note 10 at 23.
17. Ibid.
18. Brian R Pfefferle, “Gladue Sentencing: Uneasy Answers to the Hard Problem of Aboriginal
Over-Incarceration” (2008) 32:2 Man LJ 113 at 143.
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Aboriginal people.”19 Indigenous over-representation has since been referred to as
“one of the most documented trends in the Canadian criminal justice system.”20
Given the fact that the gravity of this crisis has been so carefully documented and
scrutinized over the course of many years,21 how is it that the crisis has only gotten
worse? If the problem and its purported solutions have been so well debated and
well documented, how is it that the statistics reviewed in Part I(A), above, paint
an even grimmer picture of the situation than that which the RCAP pictured more
than a decade and a half ago?
I would like to acknowledge that in the following discussion of the
underlying causes of Indigenous over-incarceration, I draw primarily on
government-commissioned reports compiled over the course of decades.
Many of the conclusions and recommendations found in these reports are not
particularly revelatory to the Indigenous people who have lived for generations under
the unilaterally imposed Canadian legal system and have struggled to maintain
their sovereignty, distinctive cultures, and traditional governance structures. In
fact, in some cases, Indigenous people have played crucial roles in the evidence
gathering and authorship of these reports.22 By relying on reports commissioned
and sanctioned by the Canadian state and the broader non-Indigenous legal
community,23 I do not intend to perpetuate the racist paradigm that privileges
the voices of the colonizer over those of the colonized. Rather, my intention is to
hold the Canadian state accountable for its role in this paradigm. If an argument
for a fundamental shift in the structure of the relationship between Indigenous
people and the Canadian criminal justice system can be constructed with reference
primarily to those voices whose legitimacy is authorized by the colonial state itself,
such an argument would seem all the more difficult to ignore. Given this article’s
concern with the Canadian legal system’s relationship with Indigenous people and
the transformations necessary to address the crisis of over-incarceration, I have
chosen to select those sources with the most purchase within that very legal system.

19. Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on
Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services
Canada, 1996) at 26-27.
20. Pfefferle, supra note 18 at 113.
21. Jonathan Rudin, “Addressing Aboriginal Overrepresentation Post-Gladue: A Realistic
Assessment of How Social Change Occurs” (2009) 54:4 Crim LQ 447 at 451.
22. See e.g. RCAP, supra note 19.
23. See e.g. Michael Jackson, Locking Up Natives in Canada: A Report of the Committee of the
Canadian Bar Association Committee on Imprisonment and Release (Vancouver: University of
British Columbia, 1988), reprinted in “Locking Up Natives in Canada” (1989) 23:2 UBC L
Rev 215 [cited to reprint].
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C. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE CRISIS OF OVER-INCARCERATION

As of 1996, not only was the crisis of Indigenous over-representation in the
Canadian criminal justice system well documented, but RCAP noted as well that
researchers and policymakers had offered a relatively consistent set of explanations
for the roots of the problem. RCAP’s study, in particular, was remarkable for its
breadth and for its insistence on understanding the roots of the problem out of
a caution that proceeding any differently would “provide, at best, temporary
alleviation.”24 RCAP considered three explanatory theories for the root causes of
the higher rates of crime among Indigenous people and their over-representation
in the Canadian criminal justice system.25
The first explanatory theory that RCAP identified was cultural difference.
Drawing on findings made by the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba (AJI) five
years earlier,26 RCAP discussed the ways in which divergent cultural conceptions of
criminality and societal responses to them contribute to Indigenous alienation from
the Canadian criminal justice system. While the Canadian criminal justice system’s
primary objectives are the punishment of the deviant and protection of society
through the segregation of offenders, according to the AJI, Indigenous societies tend
to prioritize the restoration of “peace and equilibrium within the community.”27 The
AJI also explored the implications arising from disparate cultural understandings of
concepts such as guilty and not guilty, a subject explored by subsequent researchers as well.28 As the Law Reform Commission of Canada concluded in 1991, the
criminal justice system is “plagued with difficulties arising from its remoteness—a
term that encompasses not only physical separation but also conceptual and cultural
distance.”29 Ultimately, AJI and RCAP alike concluded that the disproportionate rates
of Indigenous crime and incarceration could not be explained solely with reference
to cultural alienation. To rely exclusively on a cultural explanation for the crisis in
the justice system would not only locate the underlying problem in Indigenous
24. Supra note 19 at 39.
25. Ibid at 39-53.
26. Manitoba, Public Inquiry into the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People, Report
of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry: The Justice System and Aboriginal People, vol 1 (Winnipeg:
Province of Manitoba, 1991) (Commissioners: AC Hamilton & CM Sinclair), online:
<http://www.ajic.mb.ca/volumel/toc.html> [“AJI”].
27. Ibid at 21.
28. See e.g. Robynne Neugebauer, “First Nations Peoples and Law Enforcement: Community
Perspectives on Police Response” in Robynne Neugebauer, ed, Criminal Injustice: Racism in
the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2000) 109 at 111.
29. Report on Aboriginal Peoples and Criminal Justice: Equality, Respect and the Search for Justice
(Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1991) at 16.
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cultures’ inability or unwillingness to assimilate into non-Indigenous legal culture,
but it would also obscure the “structural problems grounded in the economic and
social inequalities experienced by Aboriginal people.”30
The second explanatory theory considered by RCAP was socio-economic
deprivation. The poverty endemic in Indigenous communities has persisted in the
seventeen years since RCAP released its report. For instance, in 2006 the median
income among Indigenous people was 30 per cent less than that of non-Indigenous
Canadians.31 RCAP was not the first commission to connect the widespread poverty
among Indigenous people to their increased levels of criminality and representation
in the criminal justice system. As early as 1967, a survey prepared for the Honourable
Arthur Laing at the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development
acknowledged that patterns of over-representation could only be understood in
light of the dire economic conditions among Indigenous people.32 In his report
on behalf of the Canadian Bar Association in 1988, Michael Jackson noted the
connection between Indigenous poverty and over-representation as an example
of “the well-known correlation between economic deprivation and criminality.”33
RCAP further fleshed out the nature of the connection between poverty and
over-representation, exploring the disproportionate numbers of Indigenous persons
who are denied bail as one manifestation of this phenomenon. Given that judges
consider factors such as employment, possession of a fixed address, enrollment in
school, and strong connections to the community when assessing an accused person’s
eligibility for bail, it is no wonder that poverty leads to an increased likelihood of
pre-trial detention.34 This more frequent incidence of pre-trial detention places
increased pressure on Indigenous people to plead guilty and curtails their capacity to
assemble the resources necessary to prepare their defence.35 Thus, while it has been
established repeatedly that there is a relationship between poverty and increased
levels of criminal activity,36 the bail process’s privileging of economic security is one
example of the way in which the criminal justice system specifically contributes to
the problem of Indigenous over-incarceration.
30. RCAP, supra note 19 at 42.
31. Daniel Wilson & David Macdonald, The Income Gap Between Aboriginal Peoples and the Rest
of Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2010) at 3.
32. Canadian Corrections Association, Indians and the Law (Ottawa: Canadian Welfare Council,
1967) at 9 (Chair: Dr Gilbert C Monture).
33. Supra note 23 at 218.
34. See RCAP, supra note 19 at 45.
35. Ibid.
36. See e.g. AJI, supra note 26 at 90-92.

NEWELL, MAKING MATTERS WORSE 207

Again, like AJI, RCAP concluded that poverty in and of itself provided an
inadequate explanation for the disproportionate levels of Indigenous incarceration.
Instead, RCAP suggested that Indigenous poverty has roots in the legacy and
continuing effects of colonialism, the third explanation offered for the crisis of
Indigenous over-representation.37 As Jackson had stated eight years earlier:
There is no doubt that poverty is a factor in the over-representation of native people
in prisons… . However, attributing the problem to poverty itself is not a sufficient
explanation. Poverty itself is a product of a particular historical process which has
affected native communities and the real fundamental solutions lie in the reversal
of that process.38

The poverty endemic to Indigenous communities, which is well documented,
cannot be divorced from its historical context. Rather, the “social condition of
Aboriginal people is a direct result of the discriminatory and repressive policies that
successive European and Canadian governments have directed towards Aboriginal
people.”39 Indigenous poverty, the crime that flows from it, and the associated
over-representation in the criminal justice system must be situated within the
legacy and ongoing effects of colonialism. By Canadian colonialism I refer to a set
of processes, which includes the unilateral imposition of Euro-Canadian colonial
authority and the corresponding attempts to negate sovereign Indigenous systems
of governance,40 the repeated attempts by the Canadian state to forcibly assimilate
Indigenous people into dominant society,41 and the dispossession of Indigenous
people of much of their land. While exploring the nuances of this history and its
impact on Indigenous societies at large is beyond the scope of this article, framing
the problem of over-representation in Canadian prisons in this manner has
substantial implications for the sorts of strategies that arise as viable solutions. As
stated in RCAP’s report on the relationship between Indigenous people and the
Canadian criminal justice system:
[L]ocating the root causes of Aboriginal crime in the history of colonialism,
and understanding its continuing effects, points unambiguously to the critical
Supra note 19 at 52.
Supra note 23 at 218.
AJI, supra note 26 at 92.
Kent McNeil provides a brief historical overview of the imposition of the band council
system onto Indigenous communities in Canada and a consideration of how this imposition
could be challenged under s 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1932, c 11. See “Challenging Legislative Infringements of the
Inherent Aboriginal Right of Self-Government” (2003) 22 Windsor YB Access Just 329.
41. For example, through the use of residential schools.
37.
38.
39.
40.
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need for a new relationship that rejects each and every assumption underlying
colonial relationships between Aboriginal peoples and non-Aboriginal society.42

In Part II, below, I analyze the above-noted legislative and judicial interventions in
light of RCAP’s powerful admonition about the nature of the crisis of Indigenous
over-incarceration and the kind of transformation necessary to address it.

II. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL INTERVENTIONS
A. BILL C-41

An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Sentencing) and other Acts in Consequence
Thereof43 (Bill C-41) came into force in September 1996, bringing the widestranging reforms to Canadian sentencing law in decades.44 The amendments that
Bill C-41 introduced to the Criminal Code45 included a codification of the common
law of sentencing, enumerating objectives of sentencing that combined “elements
of both moral and utilitarian theories of punishment.”46 For the purposes of this
article, the most significant feature of Bill C-41was the addition of the following
provision to the Code:
s. 718.2: A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the
following principles … (e) all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are
reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with
particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.47

While there was initially some concern that the Youth Criminal Justice Act48
would not include a similar provision directing youth courts to take into account
the special circumstances of Indigenous youth upon sentencing,49 the final version
of the YCJA did include such a section.50

42. Supra note 19 at 52.
43. SC 1995, c 22.
44. David Daubney & Gordon Parry, “An Overview of Bill C-41 (The Sentencing Reform Act)”
in Julian V Roberts & David P Cole, eds, Making Sense of Sentencing (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1999) 31 at 31.
45. RSC 1985, c C-46 [Code].
46. Clayton C Ruby et al, Sentencing, 7th ed (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis Canada, 2008) at 4.
47. Supra note 45.
48. SC 2002, c 1 [YCJA].
49. See Kent Roach & Jonathan Rudin, “Gladue: The Judicial and Political Reception of a
Promising Decision” (2000) 42:3 Can J Crim 355 at 357-58.
50. YCJA, supra note 48, s 38(2):
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B. R V GLADUE

In 1999, the Court was tasked for the first time in R v Gladue51 with interpreting the
significance of section 718.2(e) of the Code. Justices Iacobucci and Cory authored the
unanimous judgment of the Court, holding that the provision amounted to “more
than simply a re-affirmation of existing sentencing principles”52 and evidenced a clear
legislative direction that the unique circumstances of Indigenous people “specifically
make imprisonment a less appropriate or less useful sanction.”53 Justices Iacobucci
and Cory cited the legislative history of Bill C-41 to support the Court’s conclusion
that Parliament intended section 718.2(e) to address the drastic over-incarceration of
Indigenous people.54 For example, the Court cited the Minister of Justice’s testimony
before the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs to demonstrate the
legislative purpose behind section 718.2(e): “[T]he reason we referred specifically there
to aboriginal persons is that they are sadly overrepresented in the prison populations of
Canada.”55 The Court found further support for this interpretation of section 718.2(e)
in extensive social science research and the several commissions and inquiries on the
subject, many of which are referenced in Part I, above.56
The Court recognized that the contextualized sentencing methodology codified
in section 718.2(e) could not alone remedy a problem of such gravity:
The unbalanced ratio of imprisonment for aboriginal offenders flows from a number
of sources, including poverty, substance abuse, lack of education, and the lack of
employment opportunities for aboriginal people. It arises also from bias against aboriginal people and from an unfortunate institutional approach that is more inclined to
refuse bail and to impose more and longer prison terms for aboriginal offenders. There
are many aspects of this sad situation which cannot be addressed in these reasons. What
can and must be addressed, though, is the limited role that sentencing judges will play in
remedying injustice against aboriginal peoples in Canada.57
A youth justice court that imposes a youth sentence on a young person shall determine the
sentence in accordance with the principles set out in section 3 and the following principles: …
(d) all available sanctions other than custody that are reasonable in the circumstances should be
considered for all young persons, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal
young persons… .

Supra note 8.
Ibid at para 33.
Ibid at para 37.
Ibid at paras 45-48.
House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Justice
and Legal Affairs, 35th Leg, 1st Sess, No 62 (17 November 1994) at 15, cited in Gladue,
supra note 8 at para 47.
56. Ibid at paras 58-63.
57. Ibid at para 65.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
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The Court developed a framework for sentencing judges’ use of the remedial
authority under section 718.2(e). A sentencing judge may take judicial notice of
and consider the following background factors in determining the appropriate
sentence for an Indigenous offender:
The unique systemic or background factors which may have played a part in
bringing the particular aboriginal offender before the courts; and
The types of sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the
circumstances for the offender because of his or her particular aboriginal heritage
or connection.58

In defining the types of considerations that would fall within the former
category, the Court acknowledged poverty, lack of education and employment,
social dislocation, community fragmentation, and substance abuse as key factors
leading to Indigenous over-representation in the criminal justice system.59 Justices
Iacobucci and Cory indicated that the latter set of considerations flows from the
concept of restorative justice. The Court contrasted the principles that traditionally
guide sentencing within the Canadian legal system—deterrence, separation, and
denunciation—with those that guide the community-based sanctions used in
many Indigenous communities.60 While the Court acknowledged that Indigenous
perspectives on sentencing vary widely across the diversity of nations, it also observed
that, “for many if not most aboriginal offenders, the current concepts of sentencing are
inappropriate because they have frequently not responded to the needs, experiences,
and perspectives of aboriginal people or aboriginal communities.”61
1.

THE RECEPTION OF GLADUE

Gladue has been received as a welcome development by many scholars, advocates,
and practitioners concerned with Indigenous over-incarceration and alienation
from the mainstream criminal justice system at large.62 Soon after the Court’s 1999
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Ibid at para 66.
Ibid at paras 67-68.
Ibid at paras 70-74.
Ibid at para 73.
This is not to suggest that there have been no critiques of Gladue. For example, Phillip
Stenning and Julian V. Roberts’ critique of the methodology employed by the Court in
Gladue has provoked controversy for exaggerating the regional variation of Indigenous overrepresentation and for downplaying the unique situation of Indigenous people in relation to
the criminal justice system. See “Empty Promises: Parliament, the Supreme Court, and the
Sentencing of Aboriginal Offenders” (2001) 64:1 Sask L Rev 137. See also Jonathan Rudin
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decision, Justice M.E. Turpel-Lafond called Gladue “an important watershed in
Canadian criminal law.”63 She suggested that “[a]s a barometer of Canadian law,
the Gladue decision certainly registers as a vital departure point… . Perhaps this
is no more than the history of the common law with its dialectic of stability and
change, but I suspect something more profound is at work.”64 In the first of their
many articles analyzing the decision’s impact, Kent Roach and Jonathan Rudin
wrote that “[t]here is much to be glad about in Gladue.”65 Even among scholars
who have formulated critiques of aspects of the decision or raised questions about
its implications, there is widespread acknowledgment that Gladue represents
a significant step in the development of the law of sentencing. For instance,
Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey expressed concern about the potential for the application of
restorative justice principles in the context of gendered violence cases to “excuse
violence against women [and] perpetuate their subordination and victimization.”66
Nonetheless, she celebrated the contextual sentencing methodology outlined in
Gladue as a strategy for the decolonization of the relationship between Indigenous
people and the Crown:
[I]t is attentive to the historical, systemic, and structural processes rooted in
colonialism that influence the material conditions of many Aboriginal people
and their socio-economic marginality today and, in turn, contribute to their
over-representation in the criminal justice system in complex ways.67

Thus, Gladue inspired high hopes. However, as the statistical overview in Part
I(A), above, demonstrates, the crisis of Indigenous over-incarceration has continued
to grow over the approximately fourteen years since the Court developed the
analytical framework to guide the application of section 718.2(e) of the Code.
This trend of rising incarceration rates among Indigenous people is all the more
troubling given that Canadian incarceration rates are otherwise on the decline. Many
commentators agree with the Court that “sentencing innovation by itself cannot

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

& Kent Roach, “Broken Promises: A Response to Stenning and Roberts’ ‘Empty Promises’”
(2002) 65:1 Sask L Rev 3; David Daubney, “Nine Words: A Response to ‘Empty Promises:
Parliament, the Supreme Court, and the Sentencing of Aboriginal Offenders’” (2002) 65:1
Sask L Rev 63.
“Sentencing within a Restorative Justice Paradigm: Procedural Implications of R. v. Gladue”
(1999) 43:1 Crim LQ 34 at 35.
Ibid at 50.
Supra note 49 at 383.
“Sentencing Aboriginal Offenders: Balancing Offenders’ Needs, the Interests of Victims and
Society, and the Decolonization of Aboriginal Peoples” (2007) 19:1 CJWL 179 at 195.
Ibid at 185.
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remove the causes of aboriginal offending and the greater problem of aboriginal
alienation from the criminal justice system.”68 In fact, Toni Williams argues that
“sentencing can play no more than a limited role in keeping Aboriginal people out
of prison.”69 Nonetheless, there is broad consensus that contextual sentencing in
the spirit of Gladue has a role to play, however limited, in addressing Indigenous
over-representation. After all, “[s]entencing reform cannot cure the multiple causes
of over-incarceration, but judges make the ultimate decision whether aboriginal
offenders go to jail.”70
In Part I(B)(2-3), below, I explore two of the explanations for why the number
of Indigenous people sentenced to custody has continued to grow even in the
wake of Gladue. However, it is important to acknowledge at the outset that the
effectiveness of Gladue is impossible to accurately assess without knowing how
much worse the crisis would be without the legislative and judicial interventions
described here. While the rate of Indigenous incarceration has continued to
increase in the last fifteen years, it is presumed that the dimensions of the current
crisis would likely be even worse had it not been for the advent of contextualized
sentencing for Indigenous offenders.
2.

CONTEXTUALIZED SENTENCING AND THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE
OFFENCE

Gladue has been criticized for its ambiguous treatment of the way the unique
systemic and background factors it identifies are to be applied in the context of
serious or violent offences. R v Ipeelee, a recent decision of the Court, has provided
a welcome clarification of this issue.71 But before analyzing the significance
of the Court’s clarification of the law in Ipeelee, it is important to examine the
source of the oft-criticized ambiguity in Gladue. The following passage has been
cited regularly by lower courts to support longer custodial sentences in certain
circumstances: “Generally, the more violent and serious the offence the more
likely it is as a practical reality that the terms of imprisonment for aboriginals and
non-aboriginals will be close to each other or the same, even taking into account
their different concepts of sentencing.”72 Williams has argued that this excerpt

68. Gladue, supra note 8 at para 65.
69. “Punishing Women: The Promise and Perils of Contextualized Sentencing for Aboriginal
Women in Canada” (2007) 55:3 Clev St L Rev 269 at 286.
70. Roach & Rudin, supra note 49 at 358.
71. 2012 SCC 13, [2012] 1 SCR 433 [Ipeelee].
72. Gladue, supra note 8 at para 79.
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clearly reveals the Court’s “ambivalence about the substantive equality project
of sentencing Aboriginal people differently to reduce their over-incarceration.”73
In R v Wells,74 the Court demonstrated continued ambivalence for contextualized
sentencing in the face of serious offences. Justice Iacobucci emphasized that section
718.2(e) requires sentencing judges to adopt a different methodology for sentencing
Indigenous offenders, but one that does not necessarily mandate a different result.75
Justice Iacobucci deferred to the decision of the trial judge, who placed greater
emphasis on the sentencing principles of deterrence and denunciation given the
seriousness of the offence. In his words, “it will generally be the case as, a practical
matter, that particularly violent and serious offences will result in imprisonment
for aboriginal offenders as often as for non-aboriginal offenders.”76 According to
Roach, Wells represents a continuation of “the trend of ambiguity.”77
Courts have subsequently struggled to determine the place of the Gladue
analysis in the context of serious and violent offences. Many decisions of
provincial appellate courts have focussed more on resolving this ambiguity
than on implementing the thrust of the Gladue analysis—that is, remedying
the over-incarceration of Indigenous people.78 The way that provincial appellate
courts have resolved this ambiguity has diverged widely.79 For instance, Roach’s
analysis of appellate court decisions in the decade following Gladue, from 1999 to
2009, suggests that the Courts of Appeal of British Columbia and Saskatchewan
“have operated on the assumption that Gladue does not really apply in cases that
are particularly serious.”80 That the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal has narrowed
the scope of Gladue in this manner is especially troublesome given that the overincarceration of Indigenous people is the highest in that province.81
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

79.
80.
81.

Supra note 69 at 278.
2000 SCC 10, [2000] 1 SCR 207 [Wells].
Ibid at para 44.
Ibid, citing Gladue, supra note 8 at para 33.
“One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Gladue at Ten and in the Courts of Appeal” (2009)
54:4 Crim LQ 470 at 478.
Roach concedes that an appeal by both the Crown and the accused are more probable in
the context of serious offences and, consequently, that his dataset of appeal cases might not
be representative of the issues that surface elsewhere in the Gladue jurisprudence. See ibid at
503-04.
Ibid at 479-99.
Ibid at 504.
As stated in Part I(A), above, in 2006 Indigenous people made up 11 per cent of the total
adult population of Saskatchewan but represented 80 per cent of those sentenced to custody
in 2008/2009. See Calverley, supra note 10 at 23.
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In Ipeelee, the Court addressed “the irregular and uncertain application of the
Gladue principles to sentencing decisions for serious or violent offences.”82 The Court
heard appeals concerning the sentencing of two offenders, an Inuk man named Manasie
Ipeelee and Frank Ralph Ladue of the Ross River Dena Council Band. Both offenders
had long criminal records, had been declared long-term offenders, and as a result
were the subject of long-term supervision orders (LTSO). Mr. Ipeeleee committed an
offence while intoxicated, in violation of his LTSO, and was sentenced to three years’
imprisonment. The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal. He appealed further
to the Court. Mr. Ladue failed a urine test, which was positive for cocaine, and in
doing so breached his LTSO. He was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. Upon
appeal, the British Columbia Court of Appeal reduced his custodial sentence to one
year. The Crown appealed the Court of Appeal’s decision. The issue before the Court
was the manner in which to determine a proper sentence for Indigenous offenders who
have breached an LTSO. As a result, the Court was presented with an opportunity to
clarify how the Gladue analysis should operate in the sentencing of serious offenders.
Writing for the majority, Justice LeBel held that the Gladue analysis is equally
applicable to serious and violent offences, given that the effect of exempting them
would essentially “deprive s. 718.2(e) of much of its remedial power.”83 Justice
LeBel endeavoured to resolve the above-described ambiguity by declaring that
the “application of the Gladue principles is required in every case involving an
Aboriginal offender … and a failure to do so constitutes an error justifying appellate
intervention.”84 In the case of Mr. Ipeelee, the majority held that the courts below had
failed to adequately consider the sentencing objective of rehabilitation and substituted
a sentence of one year. In contrast, the Crown’s appeal of Mr. Ladue’s sentence was
dismissed. The majority held that the Court of Appeal’s substitution of a one-year
sentence was based on a proper application of the relevant sentencing principles.
The Court’s pronouncements about the application of Gladue in the context
of serious offences are welcome. It is difficult to imagine a more resolute expression
from the Court that the remedial potential of Gladue is by no means to be limited
to less serious offences.
Although regionally inconsistent,85 limitation of the applicability of the Gladue
analysis in the context of serious offences is one factor that must be considered
82.
83.
84.
85.

Supra note 71 at para 84.
Ibid at para 86.
Ibid at para 87.
For example, the Ontario Court of Appeal is on the other end of the spectrum of appellate
court reception of Gladue. Rudin argues that “[t]he Ontario Court of Appeal, among all the
appellate courts, has appeared to embrace Gladue most wholeheartedly.” See supra note 21 at
459.
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in understanding why rates of Indigenous incarceration have continued to grow
since 1999. Ipeelee represents a significant clarification of the law that cannot be
ignored by appellate and lower courts. The Court has sent a strong message that
the contextualized sentencing model elucidated in Gladue is equally applicable
in cases of serious offenders. While the ability of Gladue to help reduce the rates
of over-incarceration of Indigenous offenders has been seriously curbed by the
Court’s ambiguous treatment of the Gladue analysis for serious offences, Ipeelee
offers a reason to hope that the potential of the contextualized sentencing model
could still be realized.
3.

PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS

For the Gladue analysis to be operationalized effectively, the sentencing system
itself must change. Sentencing judges cannot adequately determine the proper
sentence for an Indigenous offender in the manner envisioned by Gladue without
access to information about the circumstances of the offender and the availability
of restorative justice alternatives to imprisonment.86 In the wake of Gladue, Justice
Turpel-Lafond argued that if the analysis was to have the desired effect, Crown
counsel, defence counsel, and the judiciary would all need to “adjust their practice
to reflect the requirements of the decision.”87
One such adaptation can be observed in Toronto’s Gladue Courts. After a
year of discussions among several judges of the Ontario Court of Justice at the
Toronto Old City Hall Court and Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto (ALST),
the first Gladue (Aboriginal Persons) Court in Canada began hearing cases in
2001.88 In subsequent years, two other Gladue Courts have opened in Toronto.89
According to Rudin, one of the features that distinguishes the procedural reality
of Gladue Courts from that of the traditional court-room is the role of the Gladue
Caseworker.90 Gladue Caseworkers provide the sentencing judge with information
about the offender’s background and the availability of alternatives to incarceration.
Caseworkers compile this information in pre-sentencing reports under section 721

86. Ibid at 453-55.
87. Supra note 63 at 37.
88. See Judge Brent Knazan, “Sentencing Aboriginal Offenders in a Large City – The
Toronto Gladue (Aboriginal Persons) Court” (Paper delivered at the National Judicial
Institute Aboriginal Law Seminar, Calgary, 23-25 January 2003) at 3-4, online: <http://
aboriginallegal.ca/docs/Knazan.pdf>.
89. See Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto, Gladue (Aboriginal Persons) Court, online: <http://
www.aboriginallegal.ca/gladue.php>.
90. Supra note 21 at 464.
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of the Code.91 Caseworkers play an integral information-gathering role without
which sentencing judges would be left to rely exclusively on the submissions of
counsel to undertake the Gladue analysis. ALST has since begun providing Gladue
Caseworker services in other Southern Ontario cities such as Hamilton, Brantford,
Kitchener, and Guelph.92 Furthermore, Gladue-related services have also become
available in Sarnia, Thunder Bay, and the Manitoulin District.93
While the availability of Gladue Caseworkers and related services has expanded
considerably in the last decade, many jurisdictions in Canada do not have the
necessary procedural innovations in place to give effect to the Gladue analysis.
The approach outlined in this section is by no means the only way of modifying
existing sentencing structures to make room for Gladue to operate.94 The foregoing
discussion does not comprehensively summarize the post-Gladue innovations that
have been undertaken. I offer the preceding description of the Gladue Court and
Caseworker programs to emphasize that while Gladue represented an important
step “on the road to change,” it cannot be understood as an “end point on that
road.”95 In other words, while it is largely accepted that the sentencing process
can have only a limited impact on the crisis of Indigenous over-representation in
Canadian prisons, the full extent of Gladue’s potential cannot be properly assessed
in the absence of widespread procedural adaptation aimed at facilitating the
contextualized sentencing model. Given the large swaths of the country that have
not undergone adaptation on the scale described here,96 it is not at all surprising
that the crisis of Indigenous over-incarceration persists.

91. See Brent Knazan, “Time for Justice: One Approach to R. v. Gladue” (2009) 54:4 Crim LQ
431 at 437-38.
92. See ibid at 466-67.
93. Department of Justice, Ontario - Location of Aboriginal Justice Strategy Programs in Canada
(30 April 2013), online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/fund-fina/acf-fca/ajs-sja/cf-pc/
location-emplace/ont.html>.
94. Jonathan Rudin, Program Director at ALST and advocate for the Gladue Caseworker model,
writes: “The Ontario experience is not presented as the perfect example of the needed
response to Gladue. Rather the Ontario experience is an example of how change can occur
in the system through a combination of forces outside of government.” See supra note 21 at
468.
95. Ibid at 459.
96. For another example of such an adaptation—the First Nations Court in Vancouver—see
Simon Owen, “A Crack in Everything: Restorative Possibilities of Plea-Based Sentencing
Courts” (2010) 48 Alta L Rev 847 at 881-86.
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III. THE SAFE STREETS AND COMMUNITIES ACT: OMNIBUS
COMING THROUGH
Bill C-10, the Safe Streets and Communities Act,97 is a large omnibus law made up
of several smaller bills, most of which were initially introduced by the Conservative
Party while they were a minority government. In 2011, the Conservatives campaigned
on a platform promising significant reforms to the Canadian criminal justice
system within the first one hundred sitting days in Parliament. Upon receiving
a majority of the House of Commons in May 2011, the Conservatives made
the enactment of the SSCA a priority. In their first speech from the Throne, the
Conservatives committed to “move quickly to reintroduce comprehensive lawand-order legislation to combat crime and terrorism.”98 On 12 March 2012, the
Conservatives made good on their campaign promise when the bill was passed by
the House of Commons.99 Bill C-10 received Royal Assent on 13 March 2012,100
and the various parts of the bill came into force in a staggered fashion between
June and November 2012.101
More than one hundred pages long, the SSCA amended several statutes: the
Criminal Code,102 the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act,103 the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act,104 the Corrections and Conditional Release Act,105 the

97. Supra note 1.
98. Parliament, Speech from the Throne to Open the First Session Forty First Parliament of Canada
(3 June 2011), online: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/Documents/ThroneSpeech/411-e.html>. The Conservatives have continued to advance their tough-on-crime agenda,
pledging in their most recent Throne speech to ensure that the “rights of victims come
before the rights of criminals.” See Speech from the Throne to Open the Second Session Forty
First Parliament of Canada (16 October 2013), online: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/
Documents/ThroneSpeech/41-2-e.html>.
99. Gloria Galloway & Rhéal Séguin, “Harper’s Promise Fulfilled as House Passes Crime
Bill,” The Globe and Mail (12 March 2012) online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
news/politics/ottawa-notebook/harpers-promise-fulfilled-as-house-passes-crime-bill/
article535802/>.
100. Canada, Bill C-10, Safe Streets and Communities Act, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2012, online:
LEGISinfo <http://www.parl.gc.ca/LEGISInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Mode=1&Language=E&billI
d=5120829&View=0>. See also supra note 1.
101. Order Fixing Various Dates as the Day on which Certain Sections of the Act Come into Force,
SI/2012-48, (2012) C Gaz II (Safe Streets and Communities Act) at 1672.
102. Supra note 45.
103. SC 1996, c 19 [CDSA].
104. SC 2001, c 27.
105. SC 1992, c 20.
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State Immunity Act,106 and the Youth Criminal Justice Act,107 among others. It also
created a new statute, the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act.108 Members of the
Opposition criticized the Conservatives’ use of an omnibus bill to push through
so many wide-ranging reforms. The SSCA’s sheer size and its complex impact on
numerous statutory regimes made debate difficult inside the walls of Parliament
and beyond. Parliamentarians in Opposition repeatedly derided the Conservatives
for packaging the various amendments together in a manner that prevented serious
discussion of the relevant issues.109 As Liberal Member of Parliament (MP)
Sean Casey stated during its second reading in the House, “[t]he bill is large and
includes nine bills from the previous Parliament all lumped into one big buffet
of division and fear.”110
In the months that followed, as the Bill moved through the parliamentary
process, it received considerable media attention.111 Celebrating the principles
articulated in Gladue, one reporter cautioned that the SSCA’s expansion of
mandatory minimum sentencing would limit judicial discretion and, in doing so,
“undo a decade-long effort to find culturally specific ways of diverting inmates.”112
The parliamentary debates and the submissions of some witnesses before the Senate
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs explored the ways that the SSCA
was expected to contribute to the crisis of Indigenous over-incarceration.
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107.
108.
109.

RSC 1985, c S-18.
Supra note 48.
SSCA, supra note 1, s 2.
For example, NDP MP François Lapointe stated:
We have a hodgepodge of legislation here that talks about child sexual predators, pardons for
serious crimes and drug dealers. These are all very socially complex elements. Each of them
requires discussion and reflection regarding the legal, social, ethical, philosophical and even
religious aspects. … How can the government justify putting all of that in one big package and
preventing Canadians from having a healthy debate on each of these important issues? That is
unacceptable. How does my colleague explain that?

See House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 18 (22 September 2011) at 1351.
110. House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 17 (21 September 2011) at 1306.
111. See e.g. Tobi Cohen, “NDP Won’t Give Up Fight over Federal Crime Bill,” The Windsor Star
(28 September 2011) A6; Chris Cobb, “Fazed and Confused,” Ottawa Citizen (19 November
2011) B1; Jordan Press, “AFN Voices Concerns about Bill’s Effects,” Star - Phoenix (21
February 2012) A13.
112. Robert Everett-Green, “Law and Disorder: What Bill C-10 Could Mean for Canada’s Native
People,” The Globe and Mail (18 February 2012) online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.
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Throughout the parliamentary debates on the SSCA, the Conservatives
continually relied upon empty tough-on-crime rhetoric when responding to
critics. Attorney General Rob Nicholson introduced the SSCA during its second
reading as a reflection of “the strong mandate that Canadians have given us to
protect society and to hold criminals accountable.”113 Suggestions by Opposition
members that the SSCA would contribute to Indigenous over-representation in the
Canadian criminal justice system triggered vacuous retorts. There was a repeated
refusal on the part of the Conservatives to actually engage with the substance of
the criticisms. When asked by New Democratic Party of Canada (NDP) MP
Carol Hughes whether “we should be stocking our prisons with aboriginals … as
opposed to providing rehabilitative and proper services for them,”114 Conservative
MP Kevin Sorenson replied:
Madam Speaker, I think our prisons should be full of those who have committed
crimes against our society and who have been found guilty in a court of law. I
think our prisons should be a place where we can try to rehabilitate people, but
we should hold them, incarcerate them and tell them that the penalty for crime
is prison in some cases. … We realize that there is a high percentage of aboriginals
in our penitentiaries, and, yes, that must be addressed as well, but in many case [sic]
there are many aboriginal victims who are standing right there while the offender is
the [sic] locked in prison.115

MP Sorenson is correct that many of the victims of crime perpetrated by
Indigenous people are themselves Indigenous. In fact, many Indigenous people who
are charged with criminal offences have on other occasions been the victims of crime.
It also should not be ignored that Indigenous people implicated in the criminal justice
system are also survivors of the genocidal policies of the Canadian state.116 However, the
question that Sorenson and other Conservative MPs consistently evaded throughout
the parliamentary debates was whether an increased reliance on imprisonment would
actually address the underlying causes of crime and help to prevent future victimization.
113.
114.
115.
116.

House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 60 (5 December 2011) at 1297.
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NS: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 2002) 229; Bonita Lawrence,
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(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004) (“[T]he underlying premise shaping
this book [is] that urban mixed-blood Native identity cannot be adequately understood
except as shaped by a legacy of genocide.” (ibid at xvii)).
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When asked by NDP MP Jean Crowder how the Conservatives planned to address
the over-incarceration of Indigenous people, MP Kyle Seeback responded as follows:
Madam Speaker, my hon. colleague’s question was not particularly what I was talking
about. We are talking about introducing legislation to protect Canadians from crime
and to support victims of crime. We do have an aboriginal justice strategy in place
that we are working on and working very hard to implement. However, I want to talk
to the people who support this legislation.117

MP Seeback’s blunt admission that he would rather talk to those who support
the SSCA than actually engage with its critics is telling. In these two statements made
by Conservative MPs, we can observe a compartmentalization of criminal justice
policy. While acknowledging—somewhat tacitly in the case of MP Seeback—that
there is a problem of over-representation of Indigenous people in Canadian prisons,
the Conservatives refused to address how the SSCA would affect this crisis. Instead,
they repeatedly fell back upon tough-on-crime rhetoric and vaguely alluded to
addressing the crisis through other means. Ironically, a key component of the
Department of Justice’s Aboriginal Justice Strategy, which was celebrated by
MP Seeback, involves financial support for community-based justice programs
such as sentencing circles, the use of which will undoubtedly be restricted by the
imposition of mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the SSCA.118 During
the several days of debate on the SSCA, the Conservatives made it quite apparent
that they were not interested in analyzing whether the SSCA would live up to its
name and actually make Canadian streets and communities safer, especially those
of Indigenous people. Instead, time and again they evaded pointed questions and
rolled out hollow rhetorical flourishes: “This important legislation cracks down on
pedophiles, drug dealers, drug producers, arsonists, and the most serious violent
and repeat young offenders.”119
The SSCA was referred to the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and
Constitutional Affairs after passing third reading by the House on 5 December
2011 and after receiving two readings in the Red Chamber.120 Several witnesses
before the Senate Committee emphasized the impact that the SSCA was likely to
have on the crisis of Indigenous over-incarceration and urged the Senate to make
amendments before returning it to the House. Roger Jones, Senior Strategist
117. House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 22 (28 September 2011) at 1581
[emphasis added].
118. Department of Justice, “Community-Based Justice Fund” (5 September 2013), online:
<http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/fund-fina/acf-fca/ajs-sja/cf-pc/index.html>.
119. Supra note 113 at 3974 (Hon Rob Nicholson).
120. See supra note 101.
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at the Assembly of First Nations (AFN), stated unequivocally that the SSCA
would compound “the already unacceptable overrepresentation of our people in
the criminal justice system.”121 Christa Big Canoe of Aboriginal Legal Services of
Toronto emphasized that the SSCA would chip away at the gains made by the Bill
C-41 reforms and their interpretation in Gladue:
Our largest concern with the passing of the act is that there will be an undermining
of the principles of sentencing as set out in section 718.2 of the Criminal Code
of Canada. When I say that, I mean the entire section, not just (e). … We believe
that the Safe Streets and Communities Act will make the problem of Aboriginal
over-representation in prison even worse, while at the same time not actually addressing the legitimate safety concerns of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people in
this country.122

Kim Pate of the Elizabeth Fry Society told the Senate Committee that she
supported the goal of providing greater protection to victims. However, Pate
argued that instituting additional mandatory minimums and restricting conditional
sentencing would not achieve those objectives “in large part because they are
focused on punishment after the fact, not on the sorts of measures that need to be
in place to protect and prevent.”123 Catherine Latimer of the John Howard Society
of Canada took the position that the SSCA was likely to make communities less
safe “while eroding rights and principles of justice and having a disproportionate
impact on some of the most marginalized amongst us, whether it is the poor, the
mentally disordered, the Aboriginals or the aged.”124
Despite urging by Indigenous advocates and their allies that the SSCA would
fail to meet its stated objectives while also exacerbating the crisis of Indigenous
over-incarceration, the Conservative-dominated Senate refused to amend the SSCA
to make room for the application of the Gladue principles.125 Conservative Senator
Daniel Lang responded to Liberal Party of Canada (Liberal) Senator Joan Fraser’s
121. Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 41st Parl, 1st
Sess, No 12 (20 February 2012) at 8.
122. Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 41st Parl, 1st
Sess, No 13 (23 February 2012) at 235.
123. Ibid at 301.
124. Ibid at 303.
125. The Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs recommended six
amendments to Bill C-10, all of which concerned Part I, the enactment of the Justice for
Victims of Terrorism Act. The entirety of these suggested amendments was accepted by the
Senate and the House of Commons. See “Ninth Report of the Standing Senate Committee
on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (Bill C-10)” in Substantive Reports, 41st Parl, 1st Sess,
(28 February 2012).
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suggestion that attention to the specific circumstances of Indigenous people should
be considered at the sentencing stage as follows:
I do have a concern for the Aboriginal community—I think we all do—in respect
of the number of individuals who have had to go into the court system, in many
cases, not because of their fault but because of the situation they grew up in, the
family situations that they have had to endure in some cases, and the residential
school situation we have all talked about. … I think I can speak for rural Canada…
. For the life of me, to say that “Because you are Aboriginal, it is okay; we will give
you a lighter sentence, although you have been dealing in some very serious drug
offences,” I just cannot buy it. It just defies common sense.126

Senator Lang’s remarks indicate the ideological inflexibility of the Conservatives’
tough-on-crime agenda. While Conservative parliamentarians were willing to
concede some of the social and historical context that gives rise to Indigenous
over-incarceration—for example, the legacy of residential schools—in the
Conservatives’ ideological paradigm, the applicability of contextualized sentencing
ends precisely where the “common sense” of retributive justice begins.
The SSCA is certain to have a wide-ranging impact. In Part III(A-C), below,
I briefly outline three of the policy shifts effectuated by the SSCA that are likely
to magnify the crisis of over-incarceration among Indigenous people.127
A. MORE MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES

Mandatory minimum sentences are by no means a new phenomenon. 128
However, historical analysis of Canadian law indicates that there has been a
“dramatic increase in recent years in [their] use.”129 The trend towards increased
use of mandatory minimums flies in the face of widespread consensus that such
policies are ineffective: “Almost all domestic and international sentencing scholars,
as well as commissions of inquiry in Canada, have decried the existence of
mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment.”130 As stated by Elizabeth
126. Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 41st Parl, 1st
Sess, No 14 (27 February 2012) at 146.
127. By no means does Part III(A) provide an exhaustive overview of the contents of the SSCA. I
chose instead to highlight a few aspects of the SSCA and move on to consider how it may be
challenged.
128. See e.g. Nicole Crutcher, “The Legislative History of Mandatory Minimum Penalties of
Imprisonment in Canada” (2001) 39:2&3 Osgoode Hall LJ 273.
129. Nicole Crutcher, “Mandatory Minimum Penalties of Imprisonment: An Historical Analysis”
(2001) 44:3 Crim LQ 279 at 280.
130. Julian V Roberts, “Mandatory Minimum Sentences of Imprisonment: Exploring the
Consequences for the Sentencing Process” (2001) 39:2&3 Osgoode Hall LJ 305 at 306
[citations omitted].
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Sheehy, “[t]he sole proponents of mandatory minimum sentencing in Canada
appear to be politicians whose positions on the advantages of these laws are without
a clear basis in either research or policy.”131 The enactment of mandatory minimum
sentencing laws is by no means an agenda exclusive to the Conservative Party of
Canada. According to Julian Roberts, the Liberals’ 1995 enactment of ten new
mandatory minimum sentences for firearms offences through Bill C-68 represented
the “most comprehensive collection of mandatory minima in Canadian history;
at no other point have so many been created by a single piece of legislation.”132
Of course, the SSCA has now surpassed the standard set by Bill C-68. Through
amendments to the Code as well as the CDSA, the SSCA adds several mandatory
minimum sentences and increases pre-existing mandatory minimums. The SSCA
institutes or increases mandatory minimums for several sexual offences, most of
which relate to children,133 and also institutes new mandatory minimums for
several drug offences.134
According to Eugene Oscapella of the Canadian Foundation for Drug
Policy, drug offences in Canada never included mandatory minimums prior
to the SSCA.135 Parliament’s attempt to institute a mandatory minimum for
the importation of narcotics in the previous incarnation of the CDSA, the
Narcotic Control Act,136 was thwarted by the Court in 1987 in R v Smith (Edward
Dewey).137 In Smith, the Court held that a mandatory minimum sentence of
seven years’ imprisonment for the importation of narcotics under section 5(2)
of the NCA constituted cruel and unusual punishment under section 12 of
the Charter.138 The violation of section 12 could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter and the law was declared by the Court to be of no force
and effect.139 I will return to Smith and other challenges made to mandatory
minimums under section 12 in Part IV, below, but it is worth noting at this
stage that the Conservatives’ overhaul of the CDSA is especially significant
given this historical context.
131. “Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Law and Policy” (2001) 39:2&3 Osgoode Hall LJ 261 at
262.
132. Supra note 130 at 307.
133. Supra note 1, s 17 (amending s 163 of the Criminal Code to raise the mandatory minimum
penalties for making, possession, distribution, and accessing child pornography).
134. Ibid, ss 39-41.
135. Canadian Drug Policy Coalition, “Thrown Under the Omnibus” (10 November 2011)
(video), online: <http://drugpolicy.ca/2011/11/thrown-under-the-omnibus/>.
136. RSC 1970, c N1 [NCA], as repealed by the CDSA, supra note 103.
137. [1987] 1 SCR 1045, 40 DLR (4th) 435 [Smith cited to SCR].
138. Ibid.
139. Ibid.
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The SSCA amends the CDSA to include a complex sequence of escalating
mandatory minimum sentences for drug offences depending on the existence
of various aggravating factors. To provide one example, a person convicted of
producing marijuana for the purposes of trafficking is subject to a mandatory
minimum sentence of six months if the number of plants produced is more than
5 but less than 201.140 However, a person convicted of producing marijuana for the
purposes of trafficking is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of three years’
imprisonment if the number of plants produced exceeds 500141 and the accused
used a third party’s real property in the commission of the offence.142
One aspect of the SSCA that will mitigate the harshness of the imposition of
mandatory minimums in select circumstances is the addition of a provision that
allows courts to delay sentencing in order to allow an offender to participate in a
drug treatment court program approved by the Ministry of the Attorney General
or to attend a treatment program as defined in section 720(2) of the Code.143
Perhaps even more significant is the amendment to section 10(5) of the CDSA:
“If the offender successfully completes a program under subsection (4), the court
is not required to impose the minimum punishment for the offence for which
the person was convicted.”144 Indigenous people embroiled in the criminal justice
system are also frequently contending with drug and alcohol issues,145 a reality
that is clearly connected with what Jackson called the “process of dispossession
and marginalization.”146 While the effectiveness of Canadian drug treatment courts
has been questioned,147 giving accused persons the option of seeking some form of
treatment is certainly preferable to sending them straight to prison. Sections 10(4)
and (5) of the CDSA will likely prove to be useful tools in the hands of defence
counsel to urge courts to soften the hard edges of mandatory minimum sentences,
whether in the cases of Indigenous offenders or otherwise.
To clarify, my argument is not that the specific offences in respect of which the
SSCA has introduced mandatory minimum sentences are necessarily more likely to
CDSA, supra note 103, s 7(2)(b)(i), as amended by the SSCA, supra note 1, s 41.
CDSA, supra note 103, s 7(2)(b)(vi).
Ibid, s 7(3)(a).
Ibid, ss 10(3)-(4), as amended by the SSCA, supra note 1, s 43(2).
Ibid.
Michelle M Mann, Good Intentions, Disappointing Results: A Progress Report on Federal
Aboriginal Corrections (Ottawa: Office of the Correctional Investigator, 2009), online:
<http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/pdf/oth-aut/oth-aut20091113-eng.pdf>.
146. Supra note 23 at 218.
147. See Cynthia Kirkby, “Drug Treatment Courts in Canada: Who Benefits?” in Perspectives On
Canadian Drug Policy (Kingston, Ont: John Howard Society of Canada, 2004) vol 2, 59,
online: <http://www.johnhoward.ca/document/drugs/perspect/volume2/volume2.pdf>.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
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affect Indigenous people. I have not undertaken a thorough demographic analysis
of convictions for the specific offences for which the SSCA creates mandatory
minimum sentences. Larry N. Chartrand argued that mandatory minimum
sentences for firearms offences were more likely to impact Indigenous people
because they are more likely to possess firearms than the rest of the population.148
While comparable data may be available to suggest a disproportionate number of
Indigenous people are convicted of certain offences for which the SSCA creates
mandatory minimum sentences,149 an exhaustive review of such research is beyond
the scope of this article. I am less concerned with the frequency of specific offences
at hand than the broader trend towards an increased reliance on mandatory
minimum sentencing. I contend that mandatory minimum sentences—irrespective
of the specific offences for which they are instituted—place constraints on the
judicial discretion necessary to allow the Gladue analysis to mitigate the ongoing
over-incarceration rates among Indigenous people. In short, more mandatory
minimum sentences, regardless of the crimes with which they are associated, can
only exacerbate the crisis.
B. RESTRICTION ON CONDITIONAL SENTENCES

Introduced in 1996, a conditional sentence “places restraints on the offender’s liberty
without completely separating the offender from the community at large.”150 In
effect, a conditional sentence allows an offender to remain in the community as
long as he or she adheres to certain conditions. In its submissions on the SSCA,
the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) noted that “conditional sentences have
helped to reduce the over-reliance on incarceration in Canada, and have gone
a long way to ameliorating several previous problems.”151 The Code outlines the
conditions that a court must impose when ordering a conditional sentence152 as
well as several optional conditions that a court may choose to impose in certain
148. “Aboriginal Peoples and Mandatory Sentencing” (2001) 39:2&3 Osgoode Hall LJ 449 at
456.
149. For example, according to statistics from the Offender Management System compiled by the
Correctional Service of Canada for 2008/2009, a larger proportion of Aboriginal offenders
were serving prison sentences in respect of sexual offences than their non-Aboriginal
counterparts. However, the same report suggests that the opposite is true with respect to
drug offences. See Correctional Service of Canada, The Changing Federal Offender Population:
Aboriginal Offender Highlights 2009 (18 July 2013), online: <http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/
research/092/ah2009-Aboriginal_Highlights-2009-eng.pdf>.
150. Ruby, supra note 46 at 533.
151. Submission on Bill C-10 Safe Streets and Communities Act (Ottawa: CBA, October 2011) at
14, online: <http://www.cba.org/cba/submissions/PDF/11-45-eng.pdf>.
152. Supra note 45, s 742.3(1).
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circumstances.153 Prior to the SSCA, conditional sentences were available in limited
circumstances as defined by the Code.154 For example, among other limitations,
conditional sentences were unavailable to offenders convicted of “serious personal
injury” offences as defined in section 752 or to offenders convicted of offences for
which there were specified mandatory minimums.
The SSCA’s amendments to the Code will restrict access to conditional sentences
even further and, in doing so, will undercut the progress made in the Gladue
jurisprudence aimed at finding the least restrictive sentence possible for Indigenous
offenders, given their circumstances. The most significant amendment is the addition
of a list of offences for which conditional sentences will no longer be available if
prosecuted by way of indictment.155 To provide a handful of examples, conditional
sentences are no longer available for offences such as criminal harassment,156
motor vehicle theft,157 theft over five-thousand dollars,158 and being unlawfully
in a dwelling-house.159 Of course, the SSCA also restricts access to conditional
sentences by instituting the additional mandatory minimums described in Part
III(A), above. As explained in that section in reference to the SSCA’s mandatory
minimum sentences, I am less concerned with the specific offences for which the
SSCA restricts access to conditional sentencing than with the general trend towards
increased reliance on incarceration. Restricting access to conditional sentences
removes one tool previously available to courts to mitigate the over-incarceration
of Indigenous people.
Research by Elspeth Kaiser-Derrick offers a stark illustration of the impact
the SSCA will have on the availability of conditional sentences to Indigenous
offenders.160 Kaiser-Derrick reviewed ninety-one cases of Indigenous women
offenders to assess the ways that courts account for the Gladue factors. Of the
ninety-one cases that Kaiser-Derrick analyzed between 1999 and 2011, thirty-one
resulted in conditional sentences.161 She came to the following startling conclusion
about how these thirty-one cases would be decided in the wake the SSCA:

Ibid, s 742.3(2).
Ibid, s 742.1.
Ibid, s 742.1(f ), as amended by the SSCA, supra note 1, s 34(f ).
Code, supra note 45, s 742.1(f )(ii).
Ibid, s 742.1(f )(vii).
Ibid, s 742.1(f )(viii).
Ibid, s 742.1(f )(x).
Listening to What the Criminal Justice System Hears and the Stories It Tells: Judicial Sentencing
Discourses about the Victimization and Criminalization of Aboriginal Women (LL.M. Thesis,
University of British Columbia, 2012) [unpublished].
161. Ibid.

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
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Following the 2012 s. 742.1 amendments, 29 of those 31 conditional sentence
orders would no longer be possible. That bears repeating: either immediately on
the law, or because on the facts the Crown proceeded by indictment for a hybrid
offence now excluded by s. 742.1, 29 of the 31 Aboriginal women that received
conditional sentence orders in my research would no longer be eligible for conditional
sentences for the same offences/facts today. For one further case, I was unable to
determine whether that offender would remain eligible for a conditional sentence,
because the answer hinged on whether the Crown proceeded by indictment or
summarily, which is unclear in the judgment. I only found one decision of the
31 that actually resulted in a conditional sentence order that would continue to be
eligible for a conditional sentence order after the 2012 amendments. To be clear,
that means that those 29 (possibly 30, depending on the answer for the judgment
I could not conclusively settle) criminalized Aboriginal women would likely have
been sent to prison instead under the current 2012 law (although perhaps in limited
cases a strict probationary term may have been ordered). This regressive turn in
sentencing law is deeply troubling, and threatens to further exacerbate the ongoing
problem of overrepresentation.162

C. CHANGES TO THE YOUTH CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT

Part 4 of the SSCA, formerly Bill C-4, amends the Youth Criminal Justice Act163 in
ways that will likely increase the incarceration rates of Indigenous young offenders.
While Part 4 is bound to have a negative impact on non-Indigenous youth who
come into contact with the criminal justice system, like many parts of the SSCA,
it is likely to have a disproportionately negative impact on Indigenous youth
and magnify the rates of Indigenous youth over-incarceration noted in Part I(A),
above.164 In their submissions on Bill C-4, Justice for Children and Youth (JFCY)
called the amendments a “reaction to fear-mongering and not evidence-based
leadership, misdirecting significant energy and resources… .”165 The CBA noted
that many of the aspects of Part 4 of the SSCA would only serve to undermine
the “unmitigated success” of the YCJA, which had led to the imposition of fewer
“custodial sentences” on youth.166
The YCJA, as amended by the SSCA, will undoubtedly undercut an important
objective described in the statute’s Preamble: the creation of “a youth criminal justice
Ibid at 261 [emphasis in the original] [citations omitted].
Supra note 48.
See Calverley, Cotter & Halla, supra note 14.
Justice for Children and Youth’s Submissions re: Bill C-4: An Act to amend the Youth Criminal
Justice Act and to make consequential and related amendments to other Acts (Sebastien’s
Law – Protecting the Public from Violent Young Offenders) (Toronto: JFCY, 2010), online:
<http://www.jfcy.org/PDFs/Bill%20C4_JFCY_Position_Final.pdf>.
166. Supra note 151 at 7-8.
162.
163.
164.
165.
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system that … reduces the over-reliance on incarceration for non-violent young
persons… .”167 I will outline three principal ways that the SSCA will lead to more
incarceration of Indigenous youth. Firstly, the SSCA will increase the likelihood
that accused youth will be subjected to pre-trial detention. For example, as long as
other pre-conditions are satisfied, the YCJA now directs courts to consider pre-trial
detention of offenders with a “history that indicates a pattern of either outstanding
charges or findings of guilt… .”168 Given the large number of Indigenous youth
who have criminal justice histories, this provision will likely lead courts to order
pre-trial detention more frequently in the cases of Indigenous youth. Secondly, the
SSCA adds deterrence and denunciation to the list of principles that a court should
consider upon sentencing a young offender.169 According to JFCY, prevailing social
science research indicates that young offenders do not “engage in a cost-benefit
thought process when contemplating on whether or not to commit a particular
act.”170 As such, the addition of the principle of deterrence to a youth court’s
sentencing considerations is unlikely to effectively deter would-be repeat young
offenders and will only result in the imposition of lengthier custodial sentences.
Thirdly, the SSCA encourages the Attorney General to apply to the youth justice
court for the imposition of adult sentences in certain circumstances.171 In the event
that a youth over the age of fourteen is found guilty of a “serious violent offence,”
the adult sentence for which would exceed two years, the Attorney General is
obliged to consider applying to the court for an adult sentence.172
AFN National Chief Shawn Atleo told the Standing Senate Committee on
Legal and Constitutional Affairs that Indigenous youth are “more likely to end
up in jail than in school.”173 Unfortunately, with the SSCA’s amendments to the
YCJA, the situation of Indigenous youth will be made even worse. The three
amendments outlined above will lead to the incarceration of greater numbers of
Indigenous youth.
It is apparent from this sketch of three policy shifts included in the SSCA—the
expansion of mandatory minimum sentencing, the restriction on conditional
sentencing, and the increased emphasis on incarceration in the YCJA—that the
SSCA is likely to exacerbate the crisis of Indigenous over-incarceration. In Part IV,
below, I examine how the mandatory minimum sentences imposed by the SSCA
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Supra note 48.
Ibid, s 29(2)(ii).
Ibid, ss 38(2)(f )(i)-(ii).
Supra note 165 at 10.
YCJA, supra note 48, ss 64(1) and (1.1), as amended by the SSCA, supra note 1, s 176(1).
YCJA, supra note 48, s 64(2).
Supra note 121 at 16.
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can be challenged on constitutional grounds in order to maintain and build upon
the positive, although limited, gains made through Bill C-41 and the Gladue model
of contextualized sentencing for Indigenous offenders.

IV. CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SSCA
Constitutional challenges will undoubtedly be brought by Indigenous people to
several aspects of the SSCA. I have chosen to focus on constitutional challenges
that may be brought to strike down mandatory minimums and carve out space
for the judicial discretion necessary to apply the Gladue analysis. Such challenges
may be brought under a number of different provisions of the Charter—including
sections 7,174 12, and 15175—and under section 35176 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
A review of the arguments that could be made by Indigenous offenders challenging
the SSCA under each of these provisions is beyond the scope of this article. Instead
I will provide an overview of the section of the Charter that has most frequently
been relied upon in legal challenges to mandatory minimums: section 12. In doing
so, I aim to sketch a basic outline of the relevant jurisprudence and point to some
of the ways the section 12 analytical framework may be developed to account
for the unique circumstances of Indigenous people facing mandatory minimum
sentences under the SSCA.

174. For examples of cases involving Indigenous offenders challenging mandatory minimum
sentences under s 7, see R v Martin, 2005 MBQB 185, 203 Man R (2d) 214 [Martin]; R v
Boissoneau, 2006 ONCJ 561, 75 WCB (2d) 338 [Boissoneau]; R v King, 2007 ONCJ 238,
221 CCC (3d) 71 [King]; R v Bressette, 2010 ONSC 3831, 221 CRR (2d) 183 [Bressette]; R
v TMB, 2011 ONCJ 528, 247 CRR (2d) 117, aff’d 2013 ONSC 4019 (available on CanLII)
[TMB]. For a recent case involving a non-Indigenous offender who successfully challenged a
mandatory minimum on the basis of s 7, see R v Smickle, 2012 ONSC 602, 110 OR (3d) 25
[Smickle].
175. For examples of cases involving Indigenous offenders challenging mandatory minimums on
the basis that they violate s 15, see Boissoneau, supra note 174; King, supra note 174; TMB,
supra note 174.
176. In his article about mandatory minimums and their impact on Indigenous people, Chartrand
argues:
[S]ection 718.2(e) as it applies to Aboriginal offenders may be viewed as a statutory affirmation of an Aboriginal right to have traditional concepts of social dispute resolution applied in
sentencing. A violation of the principles in section 718.2(e) would in turn be regarded as a
violation of section 35(1) of the Constitution.

See supra note 148 at 463.
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A. SECTION 12 OF THE CHARTER: JUST HOW “CRUEL AND UNUSUAL”?

Section 12 of the Charter provides: “Everyone has the right not to be subjected to
any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.”177 Generally speaking, mandatory
minimum sentences have thus far withstood the Court’s scrutiny under section
12.178 As mentioned in Part III(A), above, one notable exception was Smith,179
the first decision of the Court to consider the significance of section 12. In that
case, the Court was tasked with determining whether a seven-year mandatory
minimum under section 5(1) of the Narcotics Control Act for the importation
of drugs constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Lamer decided that
the test for section 12 was “one of gross disproportionality, because it is aimed
at punishments that are more than merely excessive.”180 The analysis takes place
in two stages.181 First, the specific circumstances of the accused are examined in
relation to the minimum sentence in order to determine if it would be grossly
disproportionate to impose such a sentence. Second, “reasonable hypothetical
circumstances”182 are considered to determine if the mandatory minimum could
be grossly disproportionate in other potential cases.
In Smith, the Court listed the following factors as relevant to the determination
of gross disproportionality under section 12:
[T]he gravity of the offence, the personal characteristics of the offender and the particular circumstances of the case [must be considered] in order to determine what
range of sentences would have been appropriate to punish, rehabilitate or deter this
particular offender or to protect the public from this particular offender.183

In R v Latimer, the Court identified additional factors from the jurisprudence
that followed Smith:
[T]he actual effect of the punishment on the individual, the penological goals and
sentencing principles upon which the sentence is fashioned, the existence of valid
alternatives to the punishment imposed, and a comparison of punishments imposed
for other crimes in the same jurisdiction.184

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Supra note 7.
See Ruby, supra note 46 at 510.
Supra note 137.
Ibid at para 55.
Ibid at para 37.
R v Goltz, [1991] SCR 485 at 506, 61 BCLR (2d) 145 [Goltz].
Supra note 137 at para 56.
2001 SCC 1, [2001] 1 SCR 3 at para 75 [Latimer].
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Considered alone, none of these factors is determinative of gross disproportionality. Rather, the goal under section 12 is to arrive at “a full contextual
understanding of the sentencing provision.”185 Some of the factors may not be
relevant in certain cases.186
The emphasis in Smith was on the second stage of this analysis. In holding that
there was a violation of section 12, Justice Lamer conjured up a hypothetical smalltime drug offender who might be caught within the “wide net cast by s. 5(1)”187
and determined that a sentence of seven years’ incarceration would constitute
cruel and unusual punishment in the imagined circumstances. Justice Lamer held
that the mandatory minimum violated section 12 and was not justifiable under
section 1 even though the facts underlying the appellant’s conviction were quite
distinct from those of the hypothetical small-time offender that he imagined.188
Smith has been called the “high watermark” of section 12 jurisprudence.189 But
in the twenty-five years that have followed Smith, the Court’s section 12 analysis
has been gradually restricted as a tool for challenging mandatory minimums. Jamie
Cameron has observed, “Any expectation that the jurisprudence would blossom
after Smith was dashed by a series of decisions which, together, show that the Court
regards section 12 as a ‘faint hope’ guarantee of sorts—one which is available only on
rare occasions and in exceptional circumstances.”190 Peter W. Hogg has pointed out
that without ever explicitly overruling the approach employed by Justice Lamer in
Smith, the Court has become increasingly deferential to Parliament when analyzing
mandatory minimum sentences for section 12 compliance.191 The potency of section
12 has been diluted considerably as the Court has limited the use of hypothetical
examples like the one used by Justice Lamer in Smith to imagine circumstances
in which the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence would constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.192 Instead, the Court has become increasingly
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

191.
192.

R v Morrisey, 2000 SCC 39, [2000] 2 SCR 90 at para 28 [Morrisey].
See Latimer, supra note 184 at para 75.
Supra note 137 at para 65.
The appellant pleaded guilty under s 5(1) of the NCA to importing 7.5 ounces of cocaine.
See ibid at para 6.
Athar K Malik, “Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Shackling Judicial Discretion for Justice or
Political Expediency?” (2008) 53:2 Crim LQ 236 at 239.
“Fault and Punishment under Sections 7 and 12 of the Charter” in Jamie Cameron & James
Stribopoulos, eds, The Charter and Criminal Justice: Twenty-Five Years Later (Markham, Ont:
LexisNexis Canada, 2008) 553 at 583.
Constitutional Law of Canada, loose-leaf (consulted on 30 October 2013), 5th ed (Toronto:
Carswell, 2007), ch 53 at 53-7.
See e.g. Morrisey, supra note 185 at para 33, Gonthier J [emphasis in the original] (stating,
“[I]t is to be remembered that the courts are to consider only those hypotheticals that
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focussed on the moral blameworthiness of the specific offender,193 and at times
the assessment of “reasonable hypotheticals”194 appears in the analysis as a mere
afterthought.195 In an article reviewing the section 12 jurisprudence up to 2001,
Roach argued that the Court had demonstrated an increasing willingness to defer
to “Parliament’s decision to stress denunciation, retribution, and deterrence over
specific deterrence, rehabilitation, and the restorative principles of sentencing.”196
Unfortunately, the case law of the last decade has offered no reason to question
the continued relevance of Roach’s insights.197
A few remarks on the remedies available under section 12 are in order. In its
2008 decision in R v Ferguson, the Court held in obiter that when a court decides
that a mandatory minimum violates section 12, the remedy of a constitutional
exemption under section 24(1) of the Charter is no longer available.198 In its first
definitive ruling on the issue, the Court held in Ferguson that the appropriate remedy
in such circumstances is to strike down the operative provision under section 52
of the Constitution Act, 1982.199 This obiter dictum arguably makes section 12 less
likely to provide robust protection to Indigenous offenders seeking relief from
mandatory minimums. While provincial and superior courts might have been
more willing to break with the prevailing trends in the section 12 jurisprudence
and to grant constitutional exemptions from mandatory minimums for particular
Indigenous offenders in certain circumstances,200 Ferguson will likely lead to increased

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

198.
199.
200.

could reasonably arise.”). See also R v Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6, [2008] 1 SCR 96 at para 30,
McLachlin CJ [Ferguson]. The Chief Justice did not actually address specific hypothetical
situations raised by the appellant in her reasons but, instead, dismissed out of hand this
aspect of the appellant’s argument. In her view, the appellant failed to identify “a hypothetical
case where the offender’s minimum level of moral culpability for unlawful act manslaughter
using a firearm would be less than that in the reasonable hypotheticals considered in
Morrisey.”
See Malik, supra note 189 at 240.
See Goltz, supra note 182.
See e.g. Ferguson, supra note 192.
“Searching for Smith: The Constitutionality of Mandatory Sentences” (2001) 39:2&3
Osgoode Hall LJ 367 at 372.
Hogg has emphasized the prominence of the principle of denunciation in the Court’s s 12
jurisprudence after Smith: “The Court’s new doctrine of denunciation, which seemed to drive
the decision in Latimer and influenced the decision in Morrisey, will make it very difficult
if not impossible to challenge minimum mandatory sentences in the future.” See supra note
191 at 53-13.
Supra note 192 at para 13.
Supra note 40.
For examples of cases prior to Ferguson in which an Indigenous accused successfully obtained
a constitutional exemption to a mandatory minimum under s 12, see R v Massettoe, 2003
BCPC 451, 16 WCB (2d) 578 [Massettoe]; R v Kuksiak, [1998] NWTJ No 103 (QL).
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caution among lower court judges before finding violations of section 12, given
the near inevitability of appellate review after a mandatory minimum has been
declared unconstitutional. On the other hand, the unavailability of a section 24(1)
exemption as a remedy means that in circumstances where the unconstitutionality of
a mandatory minimum has been established, a court will have no choice but to strike
down the law even if gross disproportionality is unlikely to arise in most applications.
1.

THE DUAL MEANING OF GROSS DISPROPORTIONALITY

There are only a handful of reported cases in which Indigenous offenders have
undertaken section 12 challenges to mandatory minimums,201 let alone have
succeeded in doing so.202 Before turning to discuss the ways in which the section 12
analytical framework may be infused with some of the insights contained in the
Gladue jurisprudence, I analyze two recent decisions in which Indigenous offenders
unsuccessfully challenged mandatory minimum sentences under section 12.
In R v Bressette, Justice Desotti of the Ontario Court of Justice held that the
mandatory minimum sentence under section 96(2)(a) of the Code,203 possession of
a weapon obtained by commission of an offence, did not violate section 12.204 The
accused, Jerome Lee Bressette of the Kettle Point First Nation, pleaded guilty to
possession of a stolen rifle, possession of marijuana for the purposes of trafficking,
and possession of a firearm while subject to an order that prohibited him from doing
so, among other offences. He challenged the mandatory minimum sentence for
possession of a stolen firearm under sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Charter. The facts
underlying the accused’s guilty pleas were not recited by the court in much detail.205
While Justice Desotti listed some of the factors identified in Smith206 and
Latimer207 as relevant to the assessment of gross disproportionality,208 he placed
emphasis on the legislative purpose, describing the mandatory minimum sentence as
201. See e.g. Martin, supra note 174 (dismissing the appeal of an Indigenous offender claiming
that a mandatory minimum sentence of 14 days for driving with a blood alcohol level above
0.08 violated s 12).
202. For an example of a successful challenge under s 12, see R v Bill (1997), 13 CR (5th) 103,
37 WCB (2d) 305 (BC SC) (holding that the imposition of the mandatory minimum
sentence for manslaughter under s 236(a) of the Code violated s 12 of the Charter). For the
BC Supreme Court’s analysis under s 1, see R v Bill (1998), 13 CR (5th) 125, 1998 CanLII
1446. See also Massettoe, supra note 200.
203. Supra note 45.
204. Supra note 174 at para 14.
205. Ibid at paras 3-4.
206. Supra note 137.
207. Supra note 184.
208. Bressette, supra note 174 at paras 6-7.
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“a specific and calculated attempt by Parliament to reflect Canadian and community
values and the harm that occurs as a result of the illegal use of firearms.”209
Without actually addressing the offender’s argument that his circumstances as an
Indigenous person should be considered when determining the proportionality
of the sentence, Justice Desotti made the point that firearms offences represent
a “serious and meaningful” threat within Indigenous communities and, for this
reason, a mandatory minimum was warranted in the circumstances.210 Justice
Desotti’s section 12 analysis failed to consider crucial factors identified in Smith and
Latimer, such as “the personal characteristics of the offender,”211 “the actual effect
of the punishment on the individual,”212 and “the existence of valid alternatives
to the punishment imposed,”213 choosing instead to focus entirely on the gravity
of the offence and Parliament’s objectives of general deterrence or denunciation.
Furthermore, after concluding that section 96(2)(a) would not result in a grossly
disproportionate sentence in the particular circumstances of the accused, Justice
Desotti failed to proceed to the second stage of the Smith analysis, in which
“reasonable hypothetical circumstances”214 are to be considered.
In R v Sheppard,215 Justice Jenkins of the Provincial Court of Newfoundland
and Labrador held that the mandatory minimum sentence under section 244(2)
(b) of the Code,216 discharging a firearm with the intent to wound, did not violate
section 12. Shane Sheppard, whose specific Indigenous ancestry is not identified
in the court’s reasons, pleaded guilty to discharging a firearm with the intent to
wound, aggravated assault, use of a handgun in a robbery, and forcible confinement.
Along with his co-accused, Mr. Sheppard planned the armed robbery of a grocery
store in an effort to pay back large, drug-related debts. After duct-taping the store
manager to a chair and gagging her at gunpoint, the three men stole the store’s
surveillance equipment and recordings. They were subsequently overwhelmed by
fear and fled the scene without stealing the store vault. The following day, Mr.
Sheppard was asked by one of his co-accused, Thomas Hickey, to shoot him so
that Mr. Hickey’s creditors would have more sympathy for him and give him more
time to pay back his debt. Mr. Hickey coaxed the accused by agreeing to forgive
Ibid at para 10.
Ibid at para 13.
Smith, supra note 137 at para 56.
Latimer, supra note 184 at para 75.
Ibid.
Goltz, supra note 182 at 506.
(2011), 310 Nfld & PEIR 277, 241 CRR (2d) 14 (NL Prov Ct) [Sheppard cited to Nfld &
PEIR].
216. Supra note 45.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
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him of a $7000 debt. Mr. Hickey then loaded and cocked the gun and guided it to
his shoulder, and Mr. Sheppard pulled the trigger. The only offence to which Mr.
Sheppard pleaded guilty that featured a mandatory minimum was discharging a
firearm with the intent to wound. He challenged the four-year mandatory sentence
under section 12.
In arriving at the conclusion that the mandatory minimum did not violate
section 12, Justice Jenkins considered several of the factors outlined in Smith and
Latimer: the gravity of the offence,217 the personal characteristics of the offender,218
the penological goals and sentencing principles,219 and the actual effect of the
punishment.220 However, the force driving Justice Jenkins’s analysis was the
seriousness of the offence,221 a common thread in section 12 cases. The unusual
facts of this case would seem to support the accused’s argument that a four-year
mandatory minimum would be grossly disproportionate in the circumstances. Not
only did the victim of the firearm discharge consent to being shot, Mr. Hickey
actively persuaded the accused to participate in the criminal act. While the accused
did participate in a violent robbery on the previous day, the court’s section 12
analysis should have been limited to the specific circumstances surrounding the
offence which featured a mandatory minimum.
Given the bizarre scenario leading to the firearm discharge, the court’s holding
that the four-year sentence was proportionate to the seriousness of the offence seems
unwarranted. This is especially true given that Justice Jenkins failed to adequately
account for the accused’s Indigenous identity. While Justice Jenkins did briefly
acknowledge the accused’s status as an Indigenous person,222 she did not explore
217. Sheppard, supra note 215 at para 29 (claiming, “One cannot overstate the gravity of this
offence.”).
218. Ibid at para 32 (including education, age, employment history, and Indigenous identity).
219. Ibid at paras 35-39 (including proportionality, the potential for rehabilitation, and general
deterrence).
220. Ibid at paras 40-41.
221. The gravity of the offence is mentioned no less than eight times in the thirteen pages of the
court’s reasons. See ibid at paras 29, 31, 35, 38, 42.
222. Ibid at para 32 (observing that “Mr. Sheppard is an aboriginal person.”). Jenkins J did
go on to consider the Indigenous identity of the accused in sentencing him for his other
convictions. Tellingly, however, Jenkins J concluded that Gladue
does not serve to change the fundamental responsibility of the sentencing Judge. … [I]n this
particular case there is nothing before the Court to substantiate that the circumstances of Mr.
Sheppard, pertaining to his aboriginal descent, which would override the remaining objectives
and principles to such a degree as to interfere with the principles set forth and argued by counsel
and to reduce the sentence set forth herein.

See ibid at para 56.
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how the assessment of proportionality under section 12 might be transformed by
this fact. Instead, in a manner similar to Bressette and consistent with the trends in
post-Smith Court jurisprudence, the court’s reasoning in Sheppard demonstrates a
willingness to defer to Parliament’s goals of general deterrence and denunciation.
Again, like in Bressette, “reasonable hypothetical circumstances”223 did not form a
part of Justice Jenkins’s section 12 analysis.224
In my view, neither of these recent decisions from disparately situated Canadian
jurisdictions gave sufficient consideration to how the insights contained in the
Gladue case law necessarily transform the section 12 analysis in cases of Indigenous
offenders. Neither Bressette nor Sheppard adequately addressed the fact that the
offender in each case was Indigenous, let alone the undeniable connections between
the legacy of colonialism and the ongoing crisis of Indigenous over-incarceration.
In Part IV(B), below, I argue that the section 12 analysis must be developed in a
manner that is responsive to the particular realities of Indigenous offenders.
B. SECTION 12 CHALLENGES TO MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES

Drawing upon Gladue and the jurisprudence that has followed it, I identify some
starting points for ways in which the assessment of cruel and unusual punishment
may be transformed in the cases of Indigenous offenders. To be clear, what follows
is a skeletal outline of the ways in which the section 12 analytical criteria can be
mobilized in the cases of Indigenous offenders to formulate persuasive arguments
that mandatory minimum sentences are unconstitutional. Further work and
research will be necessary to flesh out the arguments and analysis below.
It should also be noted at the outset that many of the factors explored in
this section are overlapping and mutually reinforcing. The factors that have been
applied in the section 12 jurisprudence cannot be readily parsed into discrete
sections. To provide one example, considerations that arise in the “circumstances
of the offender” may also be relevant to determining “the actual effect of the
punishment on the offender.” Accordingly, some of the insights from Gladue and
other cases that I have identified as relevant to one stage of the analysis may also
have applications at other stages.

223. Goltz, supra note 182 at 506.
224. To be fair, the court was not presented with any reasonable hypotheticals by counsel for the
accused. See e.g. ibid at para 23. Nonetheless, courts arguably have a duty when performing
the s 12 analysis to complete this second stage of the Smith analysis regardless of whether or
not it is specifically argued by counsel.
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1.

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENDER

One of the two principal elements of the Gladue analysis involves a consideration
of the “unique systemic or background factors which may have played a part in
bringing the particular aboriginal offender before the courts.”225 In Ipeelee, Justice
LeBel reinforced this fundamental principle in the reasons of the majority:
[C]ourts must take judicial notice of such matters as the history of colonialism,
displacement, and residential schools and how that history continues to translate
into lower educational attainment, lower incomes, higher unemployment, higher
rates of substance abuse and suicide, and of course higher levels of incarceration for
Aboriginal peoples. These matters, on their own, do not necessarily justify a different
sentence for Aboriginal offenders. Rather, they provide the necessary context for
understanding and evaluating the case-specific information presented by counsel.
Counsel have a duty to bring that individualized information before the court in
every case, unless the offender expressly waives his right to have it considered.226

From the foregoing, there are two points I would like to stress. First, when
assessing the meaning of gross disproportionality under section 12 in the context
of a mandatory minimum sentence for an Indigenous offender, the systemic and
background factors that contribute to Indigenous over-incarceration should form
an integral part of the analysis of the “circumstances of the offender.” Courts’
responsibility to acknowledge this indisputable reality does not evaporate merely
because Parliament has legislated a mandatory minimum sentence for a specific
crime. Rather, when considering the proportionality of a mandatory minimum
sentence for an Indigenous offender, courts have a duty to take judicial notice of
the impacts of colonialism, displacement, and poverty. Doing so will allow courts to
more accurately assess the ways in which the imposition of a mandatory minimum
could exacerbate the crisis of Indigenous over-incarceration and, as a result, be
grossly disproportionate. Second, while the generalized context of colonialism and
dispossession unquestionably must form a backdrop for the section 12 assessment
in the cases of Indigenous offenders, defence counsel have an obligation to present
evidence of how the specific circumstances of the accused have been shaped by this
legacy. While the Court recently clarified in Ipeelee that Gladue does not require “a
causal link between background factors and the commission of the current offence
before being entitled to have those matters considered by the sentencing judge,”227
it is clear that evidence connecting the circumstances of the accused to the relevant
background factors will ultimately be more persuasive. Doing so will give courts a
225. Gladue, supra note 8 at para 66.
226. Supra note 71 at para 60 [emphasis in the original].
227. Ibid at para 81.
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more solid foundation on which to base a finding of gross disproportionality and
to strike down the mandatory minimum at hand.
2.

APPROPRIATE RANGE OF SENTENCES

In Smith, Justice Lamer suggested that the purpose of considering the circumstances
of the case at this stage of the section 12 analysis is to determine which “range of
sentences would have been appropriate to punish, rehabilitate or deter this particular
offender or to protect the public from this particular offender.”228 Thus, the purpose
of the section 12 analysis at this stage is to assess the range of sentences that, but
for the mandatory minimum, would be necessary to meet specific sentencing
objectives. In the absence of a mandatory minimum, the sentencing analysis is
governed by the fundamental purposes and principles laid out in sections 718,
718.1, and 718.2 of the Code.229
In the cases of Indigenous offenders, at this stage of the analysis, special
attention must be paid to section 718.2(e) of the Code. In order to determine the
appropriate sentence in the absence of a mandatory minimum in cases involving
an Indigenous offender, courts must apply the Gladue and Ipeelee analysis.
Despite the fact that determining the appropriate sentence in the absence of a
mandatory minimum is a particularized inquiry, insights from Gladue about the
general efficacy of incarceration for Indigenous offenders are extremely relevant
here, especially in light of the fact that rehabilitation is among the key sentencing
objectives that should guide the determination. As indicated in many of the
commissions and studies outlined in Part I, above, custodial sentences are even
less likely to have the desired rehabilitative effect for Indigenous people than for
non-Indigenous people. As Justices Iacobucci and Cory recognized in Gladue,
Indigenous people are “more adversely affected by incarceration and less likely
to be ‘rehabilitated’ thereby, because the internment milieu is often culturally
inappropriate and regrettably discrimination towards them is so often rampant in
penal institutions.”230 If, as the Court recognized in 1999, incarceration is culturally
alienating for Indigenous offenders and, as a result, less likely to serve one of
its key purposes—rehabilitation—courts should incorporate this understanding
into their analysis of the appropriate range of sentences at this stage of the section
12 analysis. In other words, the recognition in Gladue that prison is an especially
alienating place for Indigenous people is one consideration that should shape the
228. Supra note 137 at 56 [emphasis added].
229. See Smickle, supra note 174 at para 49, Molloy J (noting that the s 12 analysis at this stage
should proceed with reference to the sentencing principles contained in the Code).
230. Supra note 8 at para 68.
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way that courts consider the appropriate range of sentences in the absence of a
mandatory minimum.
3.

EXISTENCE OF VALID ALTERNATIVES

The second major aspect of the Gladue analysis involves assessing “[t]he types of
sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the circumstances
for the offender because of his or her particular aboriginal heritage or connection.”231
This principle should influence courts’ considerations of the existence of valid
alternatives to incarceration under the gross disproportionality analysis.232 In
Ipeelee, the Court affirmed:
The Gladue principles direct sentencing judges to abandon the presumption that all
offenders and all communities share the same values when it comes to sentencing
and to recognize that, given these fundamentally different world views, different
or alternative sanctions may more effectively achieve the objectives of sentencing in a
particular community.233

As was explored briefly in Part II, above, in the years following Gladue,
restorative justice initiatives have developed across the country. While the
accessibility of such initiatives varies regionally, in many cases such initiatives
represent viable alternatives to the imposition of custodial sentences for Indigenous
people. The availability of restorative justice alternatives to imprisonment should
lead courts to more readily hold that the imposition of a mandatory minimum
sentence constitutes a violation of section 12. Sending more Indigenous people
to prison rather than making use of restorative alternatives would seem to be
all the more cruel and unusual in light of the Supreme Court’s recognition that
incarceration is a less effective rehabilitative strategy for Indigenous offenders. Not
only is it less likely to serve one of the key sentencing objectives, prison is also
inadequate because Indigenous people, by virtue of their cultural identities, have
access to a greater breadth of alternatives to incarceration. Again, the existence
of these alternatives, many of which are not only sanctioned but also funded by
the Canadian state, necessarily colours the meaning of gross disproportionality
for Indigenous offenders.

231. Ibid at para 66.
232. See Latimer, supra note 184 at para 75.
233. Supra note 71 at para 74 [emphasis added].
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4.

THE PENOLOGICAL GOALS AND SENTENCING PRINCIPLES OF THE
MANDATORY MINIMUM

At this stage of the section 12 analysis, a court “determine[s] whether Parliament
was responding to a pressing problem, and whether its response is founded on
recognized sentencing principles.”234 As is evident from the above review of
Bressette235 and Sheppard,236 courts often hold that the primary penological goals
underlying mandatory minimums are denunciation and general deterrence. The
rhetoric employed by the Conservatives in the parliamentary debates following
the introduction of the SSCA reinforces this interpretation of the legislative intent
underlying the SSCA’s mandatory minimums. The section 12 jurisprudence is
clear that Parliament is entitled to craft mandatory minimum sentences as long
as it does so “in a manner consistent with existing sentencing principles,”237 which
include denunciation and general deterrence, among others. As noted in Part III(A),
above, the Court’s post-Smith jurisprudence has become increasingly deferential
to Parliament’s choice about which sentencing principles to stress in the creation
of mandatory minimums. However, the Court has also stated that “[t]he presence
or absence of any one sentencing principle should never be determinative at this
stage of the analysis under s. 12. General deterrence cannot, on its own, prevent a
punishment from being cruel and unusual.”238 Here, the Court reminds us that there
is a limit to the deference it is willing to give to Parliament’s sentencing objectives.
In order to survive scrutiny under section 12, a mandatory minimum sentence
cannot be singularly fixated on achieving one of the myriad objectives that govern
Canadian sentencing law.
The analysis of the penological goals that underlie a specific mandatory
minimum sentence in the case of an Indigenous offender should not occur in the
abstract. Rather, courts should consider insights from Gladue about the relevance of
specific penological goals in the context of Indigenous communities: “A significant
problem experienced by aboriginal people who come into contact with the criminal
justice system is that the traditional sentencing ideals of deterrence, separation,
and denunciation are often far removed from the understanding of sentencing
held by these offenders and their community.”239 The objectives animating a
mandatory minimum sentence should be considered in light of judicial authority
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Morrisey, supra note 185 at para 43.
Supra note 174.
Supra note 215.
Morrisey, supra note 185 at para 44.
Ibid at para 45 [emphasis added].
Gladue, supra note 8 at para 70.
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acknowledging that the traditional sentencing principles have limited purchase
among Indigenous communities. When courts assess Parliament’s penological goals
for the purposes of determining whether a mandatory minimum sentence would
result in cruel and unusual punishment if imposed on an Indigenous offender,
the diminished applicability of the principles of deterrence, separation, and
denunciation in the cases of Indigenous offenders must be considered.
5.

IMAGINING REASONABLE HYPOTHETICALS

The section 12 analysis employed in Smith240 represents a significant hurdle to the
implementation of tough-on-crime policies largely because of Justice Lamer’s use
of a hypothetical offender to assess the meaning of gross disproportionality. While
the Court has gradually restricted the breadth of this analytical tool in subsequent
cases, Smith remains good law on this point. Consequently, Indigenous people
bringing section 12 challenges to the SSCA would be well advised to think creatively
and present courts with hypothetical scenarios that reveal the disproportionality
of the mandatory minimum, even if the circumstances of the accused have failed
to do so. Such arguments can be made in the alternative to those that frame the
sentence as cruel and unusual in the specific circumstances of the accused. While
hypothetical examples must not be “far-fetched or only marginally imaginable
as a live possibility,”241 there remains considerable breadth for counsel to present
scenarios that drive home the potential for mandatory minimums to result in
cruel and unusual punishment.
Reasonable hypotheticals can be employed by Indigenous offenders to highlight
the potential for gross disproportionality to arise in light of the well-established
causes of Indigenous over-incarceration. In cases where there is a lack of specific
evidence connecting the circumstances of the offence with the background factors
identified as relevant in Gladue, the second stage of the section 12 analysis provides
an opportunity to imagine hypothetical scenarios in which those connections can
be made more explicit. Where an Indigenous accused is unable to present evidence
that concretely connects the legacy of colonialism, residential schools, endemic
poverty, or other background factors to the offence in issue, such circumstances
can be imagined and presented to draw a court’s attention to the potential for gross
disproportionality to arise in the cases of other Indigenous offenders. Real cases can be
drawn upon to develop “reasonable hypotheticals,”242 and the decade-plus of Gladue
jurisprudence offers no shortage of such cases to use as starting points to this end.
240. Supra note 137.
241. Goltz, supra note 182 at 515.
242. Morrisey, supra note 185 at para 65.
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R v Bouchard 243 is an example of a case that may be helpful as a
“reasonable hypothetical” in the context of the SSCA’s amendments to the CDSA.
Jessica Bouchard, a thirty-three-year-old Indigenous woman from Long Lake 58
First Nation in Northern Ontario, pled guilty to trafficking in marijuana. She
had purchased marijuana and given it to three young girls, one of whom was
her niece. In its summary of Bouchard’s pre-sentence report, the court indicated
that the accused had grown up in a family affected by substance abuse and had
intermittently lived with relatives and under foster care. The accused had been
physically abused by both of her parents and had been sexually abused while in
foster care as well as by members of her extended family. As an early adolescent, the
accused started using alcohol and drugs as a means to cope. The court also noted
that members of the accused’s family, like many others in her community, had
attended residential school. The accused had a long criminal record and she had
previously been sentenced to jail. Justice DiGiuseppe noted the “inter-generational
impact that violence, neglect and substance abuse has had on Ms. Bouchard.”244
After applying the Gladue analysis and acknowledging that the “range of sentence
must be tempered to reflect those systemic factors that have contributed to Ms.
Bouchard’s offending behaviour and address her rehabilitation,”245 the court
sentenced her to a four-month term of imprisonment.
In contrast, if Ms. Bouchard were to be sentenced on the basis of the amended
CDSA, she would likely face a mandatory minimum sentence of two years. A person
convicted of trafficking who “involves” a person under eighteen “in committing
the offence” is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of two years.246 The
term “traffic” is defined broadly in the CDSA and includes “to sell, administer,
give, transfer, transport, send or deliver the substance.”247 While this provision has
yet to be interpreted by a court, by providing marijuana to three girls under the
age of eighteen the accused arguably “involved” them in the commission of the
offence. This interpretation is confirmed by the Department of Justice, which
has taken the position that the amendment captures trafficking “in relation to a
youth.”248 As a result, Ms. Bouchard would be subject to a two-year mandatory
minimum sentence based on the aggravating factor stipulated in section 5(3)(a)
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

2012 ONCJ 425, 101 WCB (2d) 571 [Bouchard].
Ibid at para 20.
Ibid at para 25.
CDSA, supra note 103, s 5(3)(a)(ii)(C).
Ibid, s 2(1)(a) [emphasis added].
News Release, “Backgrounder: Safe Streets & Communities Act: Increased Penalties for Serious
Drug Crime” (30 April 2013) online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/nr-cp/2011/
doc_32636.html>.
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(ii)(C) of the CDSA. A two-year sentence, in stark contrast to the four-month
term that she received after the court’s careful consideration of the Gladue factors,
would seem to be grossly disproportionate. Bouchard is thus an example of a case
in the Gladue jurisprudence that could prove to be helpful to counsel attempting
to construct “reasonable hypothetical” scenarios in which the imposition of a
mandatory minimum would result in cruel and unusual punishment.
Two recent decisions penned by different judges of the Superior Court of
Ontario raise questions about the fate of the “reasonable hypothetical” scenario
analysis in the context of hybrid offences. Neither case involved an Indigenous
offender. Nonetheless, the fact that the vast majority of the SSCA’s mandatory
minimum sentences are associated with hybrid offences makes certain facets of the
decisions particularly relevant to this discussion. Released within six months of
one another, R v Nur249 and R v Smickle250 analyzed the constitutionality of section
95(2) of the Code and reached opposite conclusions. Both cases were heard by the
Ontario Court of Appeal in February 2013. At the time of this writing, however,
the Court of Appeal’s judgments have not yet been released. To my knowledge,
the applicability of the analysis of “reasonable hypotheticals” in the context of
hybrid offences has yet to be considered by any appellate court in Canada.251
Thus the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeal in Nur and Smickle will
have significant bearing on the potential of section 12 to protect against cruel
and unusual punishment effected by the SSCA’s mandatory minimum sentences.
In Nur, Justice Code considered the constitutionality of a mandatory minimum
sentence of three years’ imprisonment, on indictment, for possession of a loaded
prohibited firearm. After indicating that there was little difficulty in constructing
hypothetical scenarios in which the imposition of a three-year sentence would
constitute cruel and unusual punishment, Justice Code went on to find that the
Crown’s discretion to proceed summarily in such circumstances provided a “complete
answer to all of the ‘reasonable hypotheticals.’”252 In Nur, section 95(1) of the
Code managed to survive section 12 scrutiny because the Crown’s discretion to
proceed summarily in such circumstances would supposedly prevent comparable
hypothetical scenarios from ever arising on indictment. According to Justice
Code’s analysis, when faced with one of the hypothetical scenarios imagined in
Nur, the Crown would choose to prosecute summarily, thereby circumscribing the
249. 2011 ONSC 4874, 241 CRR (2d) 306 [Nur cited to ONSC].
250. Supra note 174.
251. As Code J pointed out in Nur, the Court has not yet had occasion to develop this branch of
the s 12 analysis in the circumstances of a hybrid offence. See supra note 249 at para 110.
252. Ibid at para 108.
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possibility of gross disproportionality in those cases. Given that Justice Code had
already determined that the three-year sentence imposed by section 95(2) of the
Code was not grossly disproportionate to the appropriate sentence in the absence
of a mandatory minimum and given that the Crown’s discretion to prosecute
summarily was a “complete answer” to the hypothetical scenarios imagined, there
was no violation of section 12.
Justice Code acknowledged that the Crown’s decision about how to proceed is
usually made early in the proceedings, before all of the information relevant to its
election may be available.253 In doing so, he recognized that the gross disproportionality
flowing from the Crown’s choice to proceed by way of indictment might only become
apparent as the full facts are revealed at trial. In such a case, Justice Code recognized
that “one unwise Crown election may end up invalidating Parliament’s s. 95 sentencing
scheme for all cases.”254
In fact, within six months of the release of Justice Code’s reasons in Nur, precisely
this kind of situation arose in Smickle.255 In Smickle, Justice Molloy had the occasion
to reconsider whether section 95(2) violated section 12 in the case of a twenty-sevenyear-old man who was caught posing in front of his laptop with a loaded handgun. The
Crown had elected to proceed by way of indictment, which, as stated above, carried
a three-year mandatory minimum sentence.256 At the first stage of the analysis, Justice
Molloy held that the appropriate sentence in the absence of a mandatory minimum
would be one year.257 Accordingly, the mandatory minimum sentence of three years
was grossly disproportionate, making it unnecessary to proceed to consider “reasonable
hypothetical” scenarios.258
Smickle confirms the risk that Justice Code acknowledged in Nur, raising serious
questions about Justice Code’s approach to “reasonable hypothetical” scenarios in
cases involving hybrid offences. A situation akin to the easily constructed hypothetical
scenarios described by Justice Code in Nur arose on the facts of Smickle, and the
prosecutorial discretion to proceed summarily did not prevent the potential for a grossly
disproportionate sentence being imposed. In other words, what Justice Code referred
to in Nur as a “constitutional ‘safety valve’”259 did not function the way it should have.
Ibid at para 117.
Ibid.
Supra note 174.
For a recent discussion of the implications of Smickle for the constitutionality of mandatory
minimum sentences, see Debra Parkes, “From Smith to Smickle: the Charter’s Minimal
Impact on Mandatory Minimum Sentences” (2012) 57 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 149
257. Smickle, supra note 174 at para 75.
258. Ibid at para 85.
259. Supra note 249 at para 117.
253.
254.
255.
256.
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Smickle makes it clear that there is still a place for the “reasonable hypotheticals”
analysis in the case of hybrid offences. Putting aside the influence that systemic
racism has on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and assuming, without
accepting, that it is always exercised in good faith,260 prosecutors do not always
have the facts they need to make the election in the correct direction. As Justice
Molloy stated in her analysis of whether the violation of section 12 could be
justified under section 1, “Often, the full facts will not be known until the trial
judge delivers his or her reasons or the jury delivers a verdict.”261 This is especially
true in the cases of Indigenous offenders, given the fact that the Crown may not even
know the offender’s Indigenous identity at the time it makes its election, let alone how
the background factors identified in Gladue might relate to the circumstances of the
offence. Accordingly, there are significant dangers associated with entrusting the Crown
with the responsibility of ensuring constitutional compliance by way of election in the
context of hybrid offences.
Interestingly, the Crown argued in Smith that the constitutionality of the
mandatory minimum in that case was preserved by the fact that the prosecution
possessed the discretion to charge for a lesser offence in cases where gross
disproportionality would arise. Justice Lamer rejected the Crown’s argument
as follows:
In my view the section cannot be salvaged by relying on the discretion of the
prosecution not to apply the law in those cases where, in the opinion of the
prosecution, its application would be a violation of the Charter. To do so would be
to disregard totally s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 which provides that any law
which is inconsistent with the Constitution is of no force or effect to the extent of the
inconsistency and the courts are duty bound to make that pronouncement, not to
delegate the avoidance of a violation to the prosecution or to anyone else for that
matter.262

While the prosecutorial discretion to charge for a lesser offence is admittedly
distinct from the statutory prosecutorial discretion of election,263 the same reasoning
applies. As stated by Justice Molloy in Smickle, “the suggested safety valve with
respect to electing to proceed summarily rather than by indictment is no less

260. For a thorough discussion of the manner in which systemic racism shapes black peoples’
experiences in the Canadian criminal justice system, specifically in the context of mandatory
minimum sentences, see Faizal R Mirza, “Mandatory Minimum Prison Sentencing and
Systemic Racism” (2001) 39:2&3 Osgoode Hall LJ 497.
261. Smickle, supra note 174 at para 110.
262. Smith, supra note 137 at para 69.
263. This distinction was emphasized by Code J in Nur. See supra note 249 at para 112.
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problematic.”264 Smickle makes it clear that situations in which the Crown makes
an inappropriate election are bound to arise, and it is this certainty that makes the
analysis of “reasonable hypotheticals” necessary.
It may be argued that the analysis of hypothetical scenarios remains unnecessary
in the context of hybrid offences because in cases like Smickle, where the Crown’s
election is made improperly or on the basis of incomplete facts, the imposition
of a mandatory minimum sentence will nonetheless be subject to constitutional
review. Leroy Smickle got his day in court and the constitutionality of section 95(2)
was considered on the basis of the actual facts of his case rather than an imagined
scenario. Because the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence of three years
would have resulted in cruel and unusual punishment on the facts of the case,
section 95(2) of the Code was struck down as unconstitutional. However, such
an argument is premised on a misunderstanding of the mechanics of the criminal
justice system. Most criminal defendants do not go to trial. The vast majority of
criminal defendants plead guilty, thereby waiving their right to a trial.265 While
official statistics about the scope of the practice are unavailable,266 commentators
estimate that 70 to 95 per cent of cases are resolved through guilty pleas.267 The
respective bargaining positions of the Crown and the accused are inherently
unequal, and the coercive elements at play in the process of plea bargaining have
been noted by scholars.268 Mandatory minimum sentences place increased pressure
on accused persons to plead guilty to lesser offences,269 magnifying the imbalance of
power in bargaining positions between the Crown and the accused.270 In his analysis
264. Supra note 174 at para 110.
265. Alan Young has described the guilty plea as “the most dramatic manifestation of waiver. The
panoply of procedural safeguards at trial can be circumvented by this admission of guilt.” See
“‘Not Waving but Drowning’: A Look at Waiver and Collective Constitutional Rights in the
Criminal Process” (1989) 53:1 Sask L Rev 47 at 71.
266. Mia Dauvergne, “Adult Criminal Court Statistics in Canada, 2010/2011” in Statistics
Canada, Juristat (Ottawa: Minister of Industry, May 2012) at 10, online: <http://www.
statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2012001/article/11646-eng.pdf> (“The extent to which plea
negotiations are utilized in Canada is unknown.”).
267. See Oonagh E Fitzgerald, The Guilty Plea and Summary Justice (Toronto: Carswell, 1990)
at 168; Young, supra note 265 at 71; Joseph Di Luca, “Expedient McJustice or Principled
Alternative Dispute Resolution? A Review of Plea Bargaining in Canada” (2005) 50:1&2
Crim LQ 14 at 15.
268. See e.g. Fitzgerald, supra note 267 at 137-68.
269. See Di Luca, supra note 267 at 31; Roach, supra note 196 at 382.
270. This reality was acknowledged by Molloy J as one of the deleterious effects of the mandatory
minimum regime in Smickle. In his view, there is an “unfair advantage given to the Crown as
an accused will be under pressure to plead guilty to a lesser included offence in order to avoid
the risk of a the mandatory minimum.” See supra note 174 at para 121.
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of systemic anti-black racism in the Canadian criminal justice system, Faizal R.
Mirza argues that “[m]andatory prison sentences enhance the quasi-judicial role
of prosecutors, providing them with greater leverage to convict a disproportionate
number of Black persons.”271 Mirza’s insight is equally applicable in the context
of Indigenous defendants.
Given the prevalence of guilty pleas in general and the increased pressure to
engage in plea bargaining when faced with a mandatory minimum, many accused
persons in the position of Leroy Smickle will never get their day in court. Most
people facing mandatory minimum sentences for hybrid offences for which the
Crown has elected to proceed by way of indictment on the basis of incomplete
facts will not commit the resources or be willing to undertake the risk involved in
launching a section 12 constitutional challenge. Instead, most accused persons in
the position of Leroy Smickle, a portion of whom may be innocent,272 will plead
guilty in an attempt to secure a less onerous sentence than the mandatory minimum
that looms over their heads, however grossly disproportionate that sentence
is in light of the facts. Beyond the scope of rigorous constitutional review, it is
inevitable that such sentences, negotiated in the shadow of mandatory minimums,
will be inflated and will result in cruel and unusual punishment. It is this reality
that makes the analysis of “reasonable hypotheticals” a necessary element of the
section 12 analysis.

V. CONCLUSION
The SSCA is a step in precisely the wrong direction. It is also a manifestation of a
much larger problem. As the enactment of the SSCA leads to the incarceration
of thousands more Indigenous people, it will perpetuate the colonial power
dynamics between the Canadian state and Indigenous people. Ignoring the
voices of Indigenous advocates, activists, and scholars, and flying in the face
of the countless studies outlined in Part I, above—which have identified the
legacies of colonialism and dispossession as the root causes of the crisis of overincarceration—the Conservative government has chosen instead to formulate
tough-on-crime policies that will further alienate Indigenous people from the
Canadian criminal justice system.
271. Supra note 260 at 504.
272. Christopher Sherrin estimates that as many as thousands of innocent accused persons plead
guilty in Canada each year. See “Guilty Pleas from the Innocent” (2011) 30 Windsor Rev
Legal Soc Issues 1 at 6.
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In Part I, I relied on the several commissions, inquiries, and reports published
in the last thirty years to explore the dimensions and underlying causes of the
ongoing crisis of Indigenous over-incarceration. I concluded that, at its most
fundamental, the crisis of Indigenous over-representation in the Canadian criminal
justice system is a function of the legacy and ongoing impacts of colonialism. Such
a conclusion indicates that reform to the Canadian sentencing regime will only go
so far to address the crisis. Instead, a fundamental shift in the relationship between
Indigenous people and the Canadian state is necessary.
In Part II, I assessed the legislative and judicial interventions undertaken to
address this crisis. I concluded that the contextualized sentencing model legislated
by section 718.2(e) of the Code and interpreted by the Court in Gladue has made
positive, if limited, steps towards addressing Indigenous over-representation. I
explored some of the explanations for the muted effect that Gladue has had in the
face of growing rates of incarceration of Indigenous people. I pointed out that the
Court’s recent decision in Ipeelee offers a reason to hope that Gladue’s potential
to help reduce Indigenous over-incarceration in the context of serious offences
can still be realized.
In Part III, I described the way that the SSCA was framed and discussed
in Parliament before analyzing some of the ways that the Act will lead to
the imprisonment of even greater numbers of Indigenous people. While the
eff ectiveness of the contextualized sentencing methodology can certainly be
questioned, in Part III I argued that the wholesale elimination of judicial discretion
in the context of several criminal offences will surely only make matters worse.
In Part IV, I explored one avenue for constitutional challenge of the SSCA’s
several mandatory minimum sentencing provisions, section 12 of the Charter. In
doing so, I developed a kind of harm-reduction strategy to address the aspects of the
SSCA most likely to exacerbate the ongoing crisis of over-incarceration. The section
12 analysis must be reconfigured in order to account for the unique circumstances
of Indigenous people. If the protection against cruel and unusual punishment
provided by section 12 is to be meaningful, courts cannot afford to ignore the crisis
of Indigenous over-incarceration. Given the grossly disproportionate number of
Indigenous people inside Canadian prisons and the likelihood that the SSCA will
only magnify the problem, courts hearing section 12 challenges by Indigenous
offenders should use the analytical tools that they have inherited from the Court’s
section 12 jurisprudence to refashion the meaning of gross disproportionality.
Not only are there opportunities within the section 12 analytical framework to
develop a particularized definition of cruel and unusual punishment in the context
of Indigenous offenders, there is ample support for such an undertaking in the
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Court’s post-Gladue jurisprudence. In Ipeelee, the Court confirmed in no uncertain
terms that sentencing judges have an obligation to consider the Gladue principles
whenever an Indigenous offender comes before them, no matter how “serious”
the offence at hand.273 While there is clearly work to be done in reconciling such
statements with the prevailing trends of deference in the section 12 jurisprudence
on mandatory minimums, the Court’s judgment in Ipeelee supports the proposition
that the gravity of the offence (and the associated principles of general deterrence
and denunciation) should not be allowed to overtake all other considerations when
courts are deciphering the meaning of gross disproportionality.
My hope is that section 12 can be employed to contain the destructive effects of
the SSCA and in doing so create space for the continued development of restorative
justice alternatives to incarceration. While such a strategy will not, in and of
itself, lead to the kind of transformative social change necessary to decolonize the
relationship between Indigenous people and the Canadian state, there is reason
to believe that section 12 can be a useful tool in attempting to reduce the harm
that could be done by the SSCA to Indigenous people.

273. Supra note 71 at para 87.

